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In 1919, a policy to ban alcoholic beverages was entrenched by Congress into 
the Constitution - the 18th Amendment. Congressmen Andrew Volstead 
proceeded to promote the enacting legislation in the United States House of 
Representatives, and the National Prohibition Act became law. 
 
Does Prohibition deserve its overwhelming condemnation as a failure? How 
successful was the Act’s implementation? 
 
After the introduction, part two discusses the theories and perceptions that serve 
to shape the debate over alcohol prohibition. To measure its success, the Act is 
then examined according to its outcomes - part three of the thesis assesses the 
anticipated increase in economic prosperity through the metrics of government 
revenue, business activity, workplace attendance, wages and sales figures. 
 
Part four scrutinises the production and supply of alcohol, prison populations, 
drunkenness, crime rates and corruption.  
 
The success of a reform is also found in how it shapes the nation. Prohibition’s 
economic and political effects are briefly noted, as is its influence upon policing 
and the judiciary. 
 
The 21st Amendment repealing alcohol prohibition functioned to skew reporting 
of the Prohibition era, serving the purposes of ideologues and business 
opportunists. The thesis concludes that the reform was not defeated by any 
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 [W]ith whom does the historical writer of historicism actually empathize. The answer is irrefutably with 
the victor.1 
 
Was Prohibition a success? If so, to what degree? If not, then why not? This thesis 
answers as comprehensively as practicable the question - to what measure, 
under the circumstances, did Prohibition achieve the aims of its legislators. This 
examination is undertaken with reference to the various claims regarding 
Prohibition made by authors both academic and mainstream. The thesis 
examines the anticipated outcomes, assessing the promised reduction in 
production and supply of alcohol, prison populations, drunkenness, overall crime 
rates, the incidence of violent crime, levels of corruption and judicial workloads. 
The thesis also examines the anticipated increase in government revenues, 
business activity, workplace attendance, wages and sales figures. 
 
This thesis contends that success is contextual - the circumstances, the 
environment into which a reform is thrust greatly determines its outcome. The 
state of society is significant, as is the robustness of the legal system and its 
enforcement apparatus. Law-led reforms struggle to survive a hostile population 
and incompetent administration; similarly, legal initiatives thrive in a population 
that approves of the reform where the enacting legislation is skillfully 
implemented. The thesis examines the implementation of Prohibition in the 
context of its time without considering the politics of the reform or the ‘moral’ 
concerns that engendered the enacting legislation. 
 
In 1919 congressman Andrew Volstead shepherded the National Prohibition Act 
through the House of Representatives, and such was his influence that the 
legislation came to be known as the Volstead Act. At that time the promise of 
Prohibition was great. Its advocates envisioned a better world, one without 
alcohol. In this future The National Prohibition Act of 1919 strengthens the 
country. A nationwide ban on alcoholic beverages improves the moral tone of the 
                                            
1 Walter Benjamin, James Luther Adams and Oldrich Prochazka, On the Concept of History (Classic 
Books America New York, 2009) VII. 
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population, productivity increases and the standard of living rises all over the 
country. A law prohibiting the consumption of alcohol modifies the behaviour of 
120 million people, benefiting the nation and its constituents. Prisons close, the 
police force is largely made redundant . . . 2 
 
That was the promise. Difficulties in enforcement marred the implementation of 
this sweeping reform. Since Prohibition’s implementation, numerous writings both 
mainstream and academic critically analysed these difficulties. In the end, the 
Amendment and the Act was repealed. What exactly did the National Prohibition 
Act fail to achieve? Ultimately, the Act failed to be politically convenient. In 
response, much as a television network ceases to broadcast a poorly rating TV 
show, politicians pulled it. In 1919, Congress amended the Constitution to legally 
entrench temperance. Uprooting this reform required another Amendment, the 
repeal of Prohibition in 1933.  
 
Were a street poll conducted today most respondents when asked; “was drinking 
alcohol illegal during Prohibition?” would answer in the affirmative. The 
popularisation of Prohibition in the public mind, with its easily grasped stereotypes 
and now clichéd themes of speakeasies, gangsters and flappers, of dancing to 
black jazz bands and drinking intriguing cocktails, obscures the fact that alcohol 
prohibition was not absolute. 
 
The USA’s federal government enacted The National Prohibition Act to curtail the 
manufacture, distribution and sale of alcoholic beverages with an ethanol content 
greater than 0.5% by volume. Personal consumption of alcoholic beverages on a 
national level in the USA is currently and has always been, legal. Alcohol 
consumption was not criminalised. 
 
To place this in a modern context, at this time there exists worldwide (with 189 
signatories) a complete ban on the production, distribution, sale and consumption 
                                            
2 See the famous minister Billy Sunday’s speech in Harry G Levine and Craig Reinarman, ‘From Prohibition 
to Regulation: Lessons from Alcohol Policy for Drug Policy’ (1991) 69(3) The Milbank Quarterly 461. 
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of the hallucinogen, lysergic acid (LSD).3 Was LSD to be treated the same way 
as alcohol in the USA during the 1920s, or even decriminalised whilst retaining 
sanctions under administrative law, there would be an uproar.4  
 
Whilst statistics are extensively used in this thesis, some of the relevant data from 
the Prohibition era is unreliable or missing. In response, this thesis uses the 
device of quoting, sometimes profusely, anecdotal evidence from the Prohibition 
era. These quotes are chosen for their apparent veracity within the overall context 
of the evidence, a historiographic approach. This evidence is presented, as much 
as possible, without bias and in accord with the principles of grounded theory.  
 
Lacking from this analysis is the intersection between politics, public opinion and 
law, the congruence between a moral code, a social code and the legal code . . . 
including the manner in which information is disseminated and codified by human 
society in general and the US culture in particular. Whilst these facets of the study 
are substantially written, it is beyond the scope of this Master’s thesis. As such, 
this deficit represents an opportunity for further publication. This thesis is also not 
an examination of history per se, it does not contain a major explication of context 
- it is an examination of legislative effectiveness using an example from the past. 
For a good historical précis of Prohibition see Wayne Hall’s article.5 
 
The chapter and section headings of this thesis are often followed by a short quote 
that seeks to frame the ensuing discussion. A conceit of the thesis is to place 
considerable emphasis upon context when examining any legal initiative. The 
quotes provide further context and indicate a desire to avoid any form of moral or 
philosophical absolutism.  
 
                                            
3 The United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) UNODC, 2015b 
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1971_en.pdf>. 
4 See CR Ember and M Ember, Encyclopedia of Medical Anthropology: Health and Illness in the World’s 
Cultures Topics - Volume 1; Cultures - (Springer US, 2003) 377 
<https://books.google.com.au/books?id=nrMRezmNrPcC>. 
5 Wayne Hall, ‘What Are the Policy Lessons of National Alcohol Prohibition in the United States, 1920-
1933?’ [2010] Addiction (Abingdon, England) 1164. 
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Chapter II observes firstly the legal theories that influence our perception of what 
constitutes a successful reform. As alcohol is a product serviced by the beverage 
industry the thesis then scrutinizes the economic theory that influences the 
successful implementation of prohibitory law. The next three sections in chapter 
II discuss the controversial aspects of alcohol consumption that function to cloud 
the issue medically, socially and psychologically. These sections are necessary 
in that they inform the reader concerning the effects of alcohol using the best 
science available. In becoming aware of the social, psychological and medical 
effects of alcohol, this information predicts the consequences of a diminution in 
the alcohol supply. 
 
Chapter III attempts to answer the question: to what extent did Prohibition fulfil its 
aims of wealth creation, profitable repurposing of infrastructure and human effort; 
and improve the standard of living as well as the quality of life for US citizens. 
 
Chapter IV assesses the efforts made to enforce the Act administratively, 
judicially and through police activity. Analysis is provided using such metrics as 
are available from the time - alcohol supply, prison populations, alcohol 
consumption, drunkenness, judicial workload, crime statistics and evidence of 
corruption. Where the Act’s enforcement was difficult the reasons for this is 
explored, and trends affecting the operations of the enforcement apparatus are 
assessed. The instrumental role of Prohibition in shaping the US legal system is 
noted. 
 
Chapter V provides the conclusion, indicating the direction for further research 
and summarising findings. The thesis determines that any disappointment in the 
Prohibition reform was more due to a lack of political will than any inherent 




Literature Review  
 
(T)he failure of National Prohibition continues to be cited without contradiction in debates over matters 
ranging from the proper scope of government action to specific issues such as control of other 
consciousness-altering drugs, smoking, and guns. We historians collectively are partly to blame for this 
gap. We simply have not synthesized from disparate studies a compelling alternative to popular 
perception.6 
 
This thesis is an attempt to synthesise from disparate studies a more accurate 
and compelling assessment of the relative success of the prohibition 
“experiment”. As a meta-synthesis, it distils from over 450 sources both 
academic and mainstream the available evidence, to answer the question: did 
Prohibition legislation succeed in its purpose, and if so to what extent? What 
factors determined this relative success or failure? In this, the thesis is unique. 
 
As a meta-synthesis, the thesis is a literature appraisal carefully assessing the 
relevant writings and studies in the field for veracity and consistency with theory. 
This section, a literature review within a literature analysis, evaluates the 
opinions and biases of the writers providing information upon which the 
substance of this thesis depends. As thought leaders directing popular 
perceptions of Prohibition, these writers share the responsibility for how such 
reforms are viewed in the world today. 
 
Much of the material written concerning this era is historical - an exercise in the 
recording of happenings rather than analyses based on academic rigour. A 
primary responsibility of historians is accuracy to events. The conclusions of 
historians concerning Prohibition appear more in the form of statements about 
how good or bad the historian considers something is . . . determinations based 
on personal opinion rather than fact.  
 
Most of the writers in this field base their objections to the 18th Amendment on 
moral, political and ideological grounds. It seems that, in general, writers are less 
interested in the degree of success that Prohibition achieved, and more 
concerned with whether or not it should have succeeded. Their conviction, 
                                            
6 Jack S Blocker Jr, ‘Did Prohibition Really Work? Alcohol Prohibition as a Public Health Innovation’ (2006) 
96(2) American Journal of Public Health 233. 
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clothed in sociological and economic enquiry, is that the state should limit the 
degree of interference exercised over the lives of its citizens. It is a plea for 
freedom from restraint, for the ability to decide how they wish to live. It reflects a 
nobility of purpose.  
 
This thesis has no such purpose. It concerns itself only with the question: to what 
measure did the National Prohibition Act of 1919 succeed in achieving its 
legislative intent? In the introduction of this thesis there is the quote ‘with whom 
does the historical writer of historicism actually empathize. The answer is 
irrefutably with the victor’. This writer is not an historian, and is agnostic regarding 
matters of politics, ideology and morality. Such contemplations are not relevant 
to the narrow scope of this thesis. 
 
Libertarian economist Mark Thornton provides the most comprehensive 
assessment of Prohibition available. In his study Thornton declares “The failure 
of Prohibition”, describing it as ‘an embarrassment . . .’7 Thornton speaks to 
further aspects of Prohibition, saying that: 
‘(T)he "noble experiment" -- was undertaken to reduce crime and corruption, solve 
social problems, reduce the tax burden created by prisons and poorhouses, and 
improve health and hygiene in all America. The results of that experiment clearly 
indicate that it was a miserable failure on all counts.”8 
 
Thornton’s analysis is of considerable assistance in understanding Prohibition. 
In some respects however, it is flawed. Studies discussed later in this thesis 
indicate that petty and violent crime reduced in frequency whilst others, namely 
crimes against the Prohibition statutes, were created – thus increasing crimes of 
this ilk (Chapter IV:H). The saloon, commonly perceived as a major source of 
corruption, was removed from public life (Chapter IV:F). Institutional corruption 
did not feature as an object of the reform - although evidence indicates that the 
brewing companies actively worked to corrupt the process of prohibition.9 There 
is evidence of a reduction in alcohol-fuelled social problems (Chapter IV:F). 
                                            
7 Mark Thornton, The Economics of Prohibition (University of Utah Press, 1991) 5. 
8 Mark Thornton, ‘Alcohol Prohibition Was a Failure’ (1991) 157 Policy Analysis 
<http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/alcohol-prohibition-was-failure>. 
9 Ernest B Gordon and Alcohol Information Committee., Brewers and ‘Billionaires’ Conspire against the 
Working Classes (Robert E. Corradini, 1930) <//catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/003572964>. 
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There is no evidence of an increase in poor, unhealthy or unhygienic people - 
the 1920s was a period of general prosperity and accordingly enhanced well-
being (Chapter III:A). Prison populations experienced growth due to the 
increasing number of criminal statutes (Chapter IV:J). It is difficult to say whether, 
in reducing alcohol consumption, there was a definite reduction in this growth as 
the statistics available are insufficiently precise. 
 
Thornton’s ideologically driven account of Prohibition, discussed in detail later in 
this thesis, ignores any evidence to the contrary. As professor of history, Jack S. 
Blocker Jr. writes:  
Perhaps the most powerful legacy of National Prohibition is the widely held belief that 
it did not work. I agree with other historians who have argued that this belief is false: 
Prohibition did work in lowering per capita consumption. The lowered level of 
consumption during the quarter century following Repeal, together with the large 
minority of abstainers, suggests that Prohibition did socialize or maintain a significant 
portion of the population in temperate or abstemious habits.62 That is, it was partly 
successful as a public health innovation.10 
 
As an example of the usefulness of these studies, Blocker’s main assertion 
supporting his argument for a culture change of drinking in the US after 
Prohibition is the continued low levels of alcohol consumption after Repeal. This 
argument is not supported by the evidence when viewed in context, as discussed 
in section IV:F. 
 
The following statements from eminent researchers further illustrates the 
disparate, yet surprisingly similar, legacy points of view . . .  
 
Professor of American history Richard Hofstadter in his much-acclaimed book 
‘The Age of Reform’ scorned prohibition as symptomatic of  
rural-urban conflicts and the ethnic tensions in American politics . . . not merely an 
aversion to drunkenness and to the evils that accompanied it, but to the immigrant 
drinking masses, to the pleasures and amenities of city life, and to the well-to-do 
classes and cultivated men. 11 
 
Professor Hofstadter centres his criticism of Prohibition on the classist and racist 
elements of the reform. He perceives the manner in which the prohibition initiative 
                                            
10 Blocker Jr, above n 6. 




transformed American society as divisive, trivialising the real needs of the 
American people… "Prohibition,” Hofstadter concludes, "was a means by which 
the reforming energies of the country were transmuted into mere peevishness."12 
 
Professor of history David Kyvig concurs concerning the classist elements of the 
Prohibition Act: 
If nothing else, the economics of prohibition substantially reduced drinking by lower-
class groups. Thus prohibition succeeded to a considerable degree in restraining 
drinking by the very social groups with whom many advocates of the law had been 
concerned.13  
The success of national prohibition in curtailing the consumption of alcohol by 
the working class is discussed in section IV:F. 
 
Professor of History and Psychology John C. Burnham presents a more positive 
view of Prohibition:  
Contrary to myth, Prohibition was substantially successful. The saloon, the 
disreputable public drinking place, disappeared - the obvious goal of the Anti-Saloon 
League. Moreover, despite the many legal sources of intoxicating beverages, the per 
capita consumption of alcohol declined by the early 1920s to only a fraction (well under 
half) of the amount consumed in 1910. Medical conditions associated with alcohol 
consumption declined even more precipitously than total quantities drunk, and social 
conditions also showed definite changes. Billions of dollars formerly spent on alcoholic 
beverages went into other consumer goods such as automobiles. 14  
 
Burnham is substantially correct in his assertions. The political power of the 
saloon was smashed, alcohol consumption declined (at least at first), alcohol 
psychosis and cirrhosis declined (at least at first), social conditions improved and 
there is evidence of a benefit to the economy - all these matters are covered in 
the relevant sections of this thesis (IV:F, II:A).  
 
 American political scientist Howard Lee McBain focuses his critique of 
Prohibition on the underwhelming popularity of this reform. McBain quotes 18th 
                                            
12 Law, Alcohol, and Order: Perspectives on National Prohibition - 1985, Page Iii by Steven Goldberg, 
Willam F. Swindler, Paul L. Murphy, Rayman L. Solomon, Humbert S. Nelli, Mark H. Haller, Mark Keller, 
Mark Edward Lender. | Online Research Library: Questia 
<https://www.questia.com/read/14266789/law-alcohol-and-order-perspectives-on-national>. 
13 D E Kyvig and H F Jeffers, Repealing National Prohibition (Kent State University Press, 2000) 25 
<http://books.google.com.au/books?id=XsYi06oDpHMC>. 
14 J C Burnham, Bad Habits: Drinking, Smoking, Taking Drugs, Gambling, Sexual Misbehavior, and 




century Irish writer Oliver Goldsmith: “Those laws which preserve to themselves 
the greatest love and observance  must  needs be best . . .”15 Tested by this 
measure, of the "love and observance" it preserves to itself, McBain declares 
that ‘national prohibition  is of  a certainty not  "best."   It is not even good.’16 This 
appears to be a concern over a perceived unpopularity of the prohibition initiative. 
 
In a similar vein, despite admitting the reduction in drinking by lower social socio-
economic groups, Kyvig joins in on the clamour of condemnation: “In hindsight, 
abolition of the Eighteenth Amendment appears inevitable, the logical outcome 
of a foolish, unpopular reform.” As indicated by the findings of this thesis 
Prohibition was neither inevitably doomed to failure, necessarily foolish nor of 
widespread unpopularity. McBain and Kyvig speak to the unpopularity of the 
Prohibition Amendment, yet this ‘unpopular’ amendment was passed by over a 
two-thirds majority in Congress and ratified within fifteen months by the 
legislatures of forty-five of the forty-eight States.17 
 
David Hanson, Professor of Sociology concurs in condemning Prohibition, citing 
a widely held view that “. . . Constitutionally mandated Prohibition is widely 
recognized as having been a disastrous failure . . .”18 From whence comes this 
wide recognition? Perhaps historian Claudine Burnett can shed some light on 
this . . . 
  
Burnett cites with approval popular filmmaker Ken Burns’ criticism of 
Prohibition:19 
Prohibition turned law-abiding citizens into criminals, made a mockery of the justice 
system, caused illicit drinking to seem glamorous and fun, encouraged neighborhood 
gangs to become national crime syndicates, permitted government officials to bend 
                                            
15 O Goldsmith and D MASSON, The Miscellaneous Works of Oliver Goldsmith. With Biographical 
Introduction by Professor Masson. (The Globe Edition.). (Macmillan Company, 1869) 405 
<https://books.google.com.au/books?id=rdhUAAAAcAAJ>. 
16 HL McBain, Prohibition Legal and Illegal (Literary Licensing, LLC, 2013) 
<http://books.google.com.au/books?id=xR0lmQEACAAJ>. 
17 Henry S Cohn and Ethan Davis, ‘Stopping the Wind That Blows and the Rivers That Run: Connecticut 
and Rhode Island Reject the Prohibition Amendment’ [2009] SSRN Electronic Journal 
<http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1418009>. 
18 David J Hanson, Repeal of National Prohibition (5 December 2003) Alcohol Problems & Solutions 
<https://www.alcoholproblemsandsolutions.org/Controversies/1070639077.html>. 
19 C Burnett, Prohibition Madness: Life and Death in and Around Long Beach, California, 1920-1933 
(AuthorHouse, 2013) xii <http://books.google.com.au/books?id=4CoRsfIabqsC>. 
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and sometimes even break the law, and fostered cynicism and hypocrisies that 
corroded the social contract all across the country. Thugs became celebrities, 
responsible authority was rendered impotent. Social mores in place for a century were 
obliterated. Especially among the young, and most especially among young women, 
liquor consumption skyrocketed, propelling the rest of the culture with it. 20 
 
This is a comprehensive and sensationalist criticism of Prohibition. In citing a 
filmmaker (however accomplished) Burnett courts the populist trap of public 
perception. Filmmakers seek to sell films and historians seek to sell books. Each 
of Burns’ statements is examined in this thesis, and their significance weighed. 
The evidence, as seen in the body of this thesis, produces a more nuanced 
picture of Prohibition than that projected by filmmaker Ken Burns.  
 
Journalist and historian Edward Behr makes this pronouncement of Prohibition: 
In its simplistic determination to strike at the root of a "social evil" without any thought 
of the consequences, or of the means required to enforce it, Prohibition was a striking 
example of the American propensity to believe that society was infinitely malleable and 
that all it would take to rid America of its blemishes and turn it into a promised land 
would be a few well-meaning laws. 
 
Edward Behr’s assertion is simplistic and incorrect. There are many who did 
consider the consequences and voiced their advice. 21 Provisions were put in 
place for enforcement. Whilst the reform was significant in character it was but 
an extension of that which was in place at both a local and state level. As 
explored in chapter IV:B, the Act was carefully thought through and the best that 
could be politically achieved at that time. Unfortunately, the politics of Prohibition 
are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Behr stresses the intersection between law, morality and politics. 22 Behr goes on to 
write that Prohibition: 
also embodied a number of righteous beliefs in the perfectibility of human nature and 
the legitimacy of the moral imperative to improve the health and well-being of the 
masses whether they liked it or not that revealed a perennial American naiveté of the 
type embodied by successive generations of idealist-politicians. 23 (italics mine) 
 
                                            
20 Prohibition: About the Series | PBS <http://www.pbs.org/kenburns/prohibition/about/>. 
21 Daniel Okrent, Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition, 1920-1933 (Scribner, 2010) 108. 
22 this author has partly written an explication on the intersection between the legal system and morality 
titled "Law In The National Interest", however this is at a doctorate level and beyond the scope of this 
master's thesis 
23 E Behr, Prohibition: Thirteen Years That Changed America (Skyhorse Publishing Company, Incorporated, 
2013) 4 <http://books.google.com.au/books?id=8gAtAgAAQBAJ> 4. 
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Kyvig also characterises National Prohibition as ‘a righteous effort to deal with 
the serious social problem of alcoholic overindulgence.’ 24 (italics mine) This 
statement represents a denunciation of law as a moral agent. The act of decrying 
moral idealism in law is in itself a value, or moral, judgement that is irrelevant to 
the narrow scope of this thesis. 
 
Historian Andrew Sinclair shares this view of the National Prohibition Act: 
“Prohibition sought to regulate human morality and human habits”.25 Sinclair 
goes on to characterise Prohibition as the product of a more traditional point of 
view, one inconsistent with the increasing modernity of American society: ‘It was 
a part of the whole process, the last hope of the declining village. It was less of 
a farce than a tragedy, less of a mistake than a proof of changing times.’26  
 
Hofstadter agrees, writing that Prohibition was an exercise in ‘public self-
castigation’ a ‘reaction against personal and physical indulgence and material 
success’ - in his opinion a reform inconsistent with the aspirations of a modern 
developed society.27 Historians grappling with providing an explanation for the 
incidence of the Prohibition reform often characterise the Act as consistent with 
an archaic morality. Sections II:C-E of this thesis demonstrate that a desire for 
alcohol prohibition is a natural consequence of the enormous social and personal 
cost of alcohol consumption, a cost with national economic consequences. 
 
As is seen as in this thesis, Prohibition was neither a farce, a tragedy nor a 
mistake. The framers of the National Prohibition Act of 1919 were aware of the 
danger that Prohibition could be seen as a sumptuary law.28 The Act was 
acknowledged as a compromise, a balancing act between states, between 
churches, between industrialists and farmers, between political idealists of one 
                                            
24 Kyvig and Jeffers, above n 13, 3. 
25 A Sinclair, Prohibition: The Era of Excess (Little, Brown, 1962) 414 
<https://archive.org/download/prohibitiontheer006613mbp/prohibitiontheer006613mbp.pdf>. 
26 Ibid 5. 
27 Hofstadter, above n 11, 289.  
28 See Chapter IV:B 
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stripe and those of another. The process of politics does not necessarily produce 
perfect laws.29 
 
Sinclair goes on to speak of the lessons of Prohibition: ‘The fine frenzy of a 
minority, a long period of indoctrination, a powerful pressure group, and a state 
of national fear can cause the adoption of an ill-considered reform.’ 30 Hofstadter 
shares this misconception, describing the push for Prohibition as a ‘moral frenzy’ 
designed to ‘to moralize private life through public action’.31  
 
Characterising the well-considered convictions of the prohibitionists as a frenzy 
is unkind; the push for Prohibition originated with a temperance movement 1810s 
and developed over a century. 32 Calling the prohibitionists’ education campaign 
‘indoctrination’ displays a lack of understanding of the manner by which 
information disseminates in society. The anti-saloon league (ASL) was a single 
issue ‘powerful pressure group’ petitioning government for change much as 
many such groups, such as the gun lobby, do today. This is in no way 
extraordinary, but for being the first to achieve such widespread success in 
promoting reform. Finally, to say that there was a state of national fear is 
hyperbole. 
 
Sinclair goes on to say ‘But the success of an unpopular change is illusory, a 
mere string of words on a document. Enforcement is all.’33 Sinclair is clearly of 
the opinion that enforcement was lacking, yet as professor of criminal justice 
Mark Moore says:  
. . . the conventional view of Prohibition is not supported by the facts . . . Prohibition 
did not end alcohol use. What is remarkable, however, is that a relatively narrow 
political movement, relying on a relatively weak set of statutes, succeeded in reducing, 
by one-third, the consumption of a drug that had wide historical and popular sanction.34  
 
                                            
29 See, e.g. Douglas A Irwin and Randall S Kroszner, ‘Log-Rolling and Economic Interests in the Passage of 
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff’ (Elsevier, 1996) 173. 
30 Sinclair, above n 25, 416. 
31 Hofstadter, above n 11, 287. 
32 Rohrer, James R, ‘The Origins of the Temperance Movement: A Reinterpretation’ (1990) 24 Journal of 
American Studies 228 <http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0021875800029753> 
33 Sinclair, above n 25, 416. 




In 1968 social historian, John Burnham wrote: 
In the last years of prohibition it became very easy - at least in some areas with large 
populations - to obtain relatively good liquor. Many people, relying on their memories, 
have generalized from this later period, after about 1925, to all of the prohibition years 
and have come, falsely, to the conclusion that enforcement was neither real nor 
practical.  Over-all one can say that considering the relatively slight amount of effort put 
into it, enforcement was surprisingly effective in many places, and particularly in the 
early years.35 
 
Burnham is an exception. Most academic writers agree that the National 
Prohibition Act was an abysmal failure.36 This spectrum of academic thought 
almost invariably approves the view of the Association Against the Prohibition 
Amendment (the AAPA, a lobby group active in the late 1920s in the lead up to 
Repeal) that Prohibition is and was always destined to be a disaster. From the 
evidence of their writings, this statement is made for several reasons - an 
ideological opposition to the reform, a pervasive ‘common sense’ approach 
modulated by populist media reports, and reasonable conclusions based upon 
faulty evidence. Enforcement effectiveness is discussed in chapter IV of this 
thesis. 
 
The above quotes indicate the dominance of incomplete studies that promote a 
limited understanding, a mischaracterisation and misinformation, a decrying by 
righteous ideologues of a righteous ideology of which they do not approve. For 
this reason, the conclusions drawn by academics in the field are relevant only in 
the manner by which they reflect and are reflected by public opinion. In contrast, 
this thesis takes only the information provided, weighs it for veracity and 
consistency with theory, assesses the historical context and provides 
conclusions based on the principles of grounded theory. 
 
Burnham says: ‘the prohibition experiment, as the evidence stands today, can 
more easily be considered a success than a failure.’ 37 Each of the 
aforementioned authors portray a picture of Prohibition from the distinct points of 
                                            
35 John C Burnham, ‘New Perspectives on the Prohibition “Experiment” of the 1920’s’ (1968) 2(1) 
Journal of Social History 51 <http://jsh.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/1/51.full.pdf> 59. 
36 Hall, above n 5. 
37  Burnham, above n 35. 
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view of their disciplines, much as the parable of blind men feeling an elephant. 38 
Each man feels the elephant (trunk, leg, tail et cetera) and describes the beast 
from that distinct point of view, thereby missing or distorting the whole picture. 
A conceit of this thesis is that it attempts, in a multidisciplinary approach, to 
portray with the best possible precision the ‘elephant in the room’ of Prohibition.  
 
  
                                            




II. THEORY  
 
‘[A]t large’ philosophising which is not addressed to any particular system or practice of criminal law is, 




A Legal Theory 
 
This section examines views of law, and shows how these constructions function 
to affect writers’ reporting of legal matters. Populist reporting tends towards the 
simplistic - if something is designated as ‘wrong’, then people simply should not 
do it – a Calvinist perspective.40 Academic analyses tend to be more nuanced, 
looking to degrees of success rather than a binary point of view where any 
transgression of a law indicates failure. This examination is undertaken with 
reference to The National Prohibition Act of 1919, also known as the Volstead 
Act.  
 
Blackstone in 1765 described the law as a set of moral standards, ‘a rule of civil 
conduct prescribed by the Supreme power in a state commanding what is right, 
and prohibiting what is wrong’.41 In 1925, the Chief Justice of North Carolina 
described the law and its legal institutions, saying ‘The best friend you have is the 
law of North Carolina. It protects you the day you are born; it surrounds you and 
shields you as long as you live, and it stands sentinel and guard at your tomb.’42 
Continuing this theme, Walzer in 1983 said, ‘we need to develop the idea that 
security is a public good, available to all citizens within a political community on 
account simply of their membership of that community’.43 
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This view promotes law as a stabilising influence that regulates the action of all 
the players in society. Its attraction is positivist, law you can trust: ‘being governed 
by rules that are fixed, knowable, and certain’.44 This viewpoint tends to prefer 
literal interpretations of the law – accordingly, a law’s purpose is determined from 
an examination of the ‘letter of the law’, its text. In this legal model, the sovereign 
wields power through the filter of law, as expressed in the popular dictum, ‘a 
government of laws and not of men’.45 In this perspective police, the enforcement 
arm of government, simply enforce the rules laid down by decree. This leads to 
the impression in public culture that there should be full enforcement of the law, 
as is right and proper.46 In this version of the law, its enforcement is not capricious 
nor does it victimise the powerless . . . as a benevolent friend the law plays its 
important hegemonic function of managing expectations. 
 
Other writers contest the concept of law as our ‘friend’. Skolnick and Dombrink in 
1978 promoted an ethical view of the law, writing that: ‘The utility or propriety of a 
criminal law is not measured in votes but in shared values’.47 Friedman in 1985 
placed this in a political context when he said that general legal culture is 
composed of the ‘attitudes and values held by people who exert explicit or implicit 
pressure on the legal system.’ Friedman considers that general legal culture does 
not reflect simply the ‘culture of the man and woman in the street’ but also ‘rich 
and powerful people’.48 In this frame of reference each person has a stake in the 
exercise of law and exerts influence upon the legal system according to their 
relative power and intent. 
 
From this viewpoint, legal initiatives are an exercise by various powerful players 
in advancing their interests at the expense of other stakeholders.49 Using this 
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metric, rather than seeking to characterise the ‘Prohibition Experiment’ as a 
blunder by well-meaning legislators, the reform is a shift in the power and reach 
of self-interested institutions within society. By this measure, a law is a success 
or failure from an individual perspective, determined by whether a particular 
stakeholder finds that the law is beneficial or detrimental to their interests. From 
this perspective lawmaking is an anarchic political process akin to a fight in a bag 
of cats. 
 
From a Foucauldian point of view the law is an impersonal mechanism that 
maintains the exercise of power and administers populations as part of an overall 
strategy of control called ‘governmentality’.50 In this frame law is an oppressive 
yet sustaining tool to maintain the compliance of a population, serving the 
interests of government and its various constituents. Examining the underlying 
interests of government and the fundamental purpose of law is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
 
From a simplistic legal perspective an act is wrong if a law decrees it to be so. 
From this viewpoint a law’s success can be measured according to whether the 
wrong action continues to be practised - if this transgression endures then that 
law is not a success . . . it has not ‘stamped out’ the aberrant practice.  
 
Legal writers’ perception of Prohibition, its relative merits and degree of ‘success’, 
are influenced by what concept of law holds sway in their minds -  and accordingly 
the lens through which the events from 1919 to 1933 are viewed.  
 
This thesis does not use an Aristotelian, Calvinist or politically anarchic frame as 
the metric of success - it measures the National Prohibition Act’s effectiveness by 
the degree to which compliance was achieved. The metrics by which most 
scholars measure the success of the National Alcohol Prohibition Act are the 
reduction in production and supply of alcohol, prison populations, drunkenness, 
                                            




overall crime rates, the incidence of violent crime, levels of corruption and judicial 
workloads. These metrics are evaluated in following sections. 
 
From an antithetical point of view, the measure of a law’s success is not to be 
found in the degree to which antisocial behaviour is reduced, but rather to what 
measure prosocial behaviour is encouraged.51 In this model, the law is 
aspirational, seeking to guide and inspire the citizenry toward socially beneficial 
activity - law achieves degrees of success according to the measure by which 
harmonious and productive behaviour is promoted.52 Such productive behaviour 
has as its metric general prosperity; measured using economic tools such as 
examining government revenues, business activity, absentee rates, wages, sales 
figures and population growth as examined in later sections. 
 
The success of enforcement practices in promoting Prohibition is not to be found 
in absolute terms, but rather within the context of the environment in which the 
enforcement apparatus functions. To gain an understanding of the difficulty that 
the enforcement arm of government experienced in implementing Prohibition, and 
thus the degree of its success, it is unfortunately relevant and necessary to 
consider economic theory. 
 
 
B Economic Theory 
 
Prohibition is designed to curtail the production, exchange, and consumption of a good with the ultimate 
goal of extinguishing it.53 
 
The goal of extinguishing trade in a particular good or service is aspirational - 
human nature dictates that there will always be a level of deviant behaviour 
despite executive interest in its eradication. What can be achieved is behaviour 
minimisation. In the words of Mark Thornton: ‘The amount of resources devoted 
                                            
51 Lynn Stout, Cultivating Conscience: How Good Laws Make Good People (Princeton University Press, 
2010) 7. 
52 Willa Bruce, ‘Ethical People Are Productive People’ [1994] Public Productivity & Management Review 
241. 
53 Thornton, The Economics of Prohibition above n 7 73. 
20 
 
to the enforcement of prohibition will (with a given penalty structure) determine 
the degree of risk placed on market participants and therefore the effects 
prohibition will have on production and consumption’.54 
 
Laws cost money to administer and enforce. In return, laws should provide a 
payoff to the people ruled by that legal system. Econometrics affords the measure 
by which that prosperity is judged. Economics is able to model human activity in 
terms of productive and distributive value. One way to evaluate a reform is 
through its influence upon the economic value of human activity, the economics 
of a country. 
 
Governments levy economic activity to fund their activities - without revenue a 
vast system of coordination and oversight slows down and stops. Modern 
government is dependent upon taxation systems, and taxation is dependent upon 
exchange - whether that is a trade in goods, or services. Profitable trade allows 
the accumulation of capital, and capital enables individuals and groups to wield 
vast economic and social power. These well-capitalised groups operate as 
powerful stakeholders capable of influencing the shape of legislation and 
ultimately the effectiveness of its implementation. 
 
This section examines the economic factors that influence the ease with which a 
prohibition may be implemented. Once the economic environment is assessed, 
econometric tools allows the examination of law enforcement using cost benefit 
analysis - a calculation as to how effective enforcement practices will be in 
modifying the target population’s economic behaviour, and at what price. 
Enforcement also affects the prohibited product in its production, distribution and 
sale, changing its characteristics and profit structure. 
 
Prohibition with a capital P was a policy devoted to reducing the supply of 
alcoholic beverages. In this context, its success is measured by the degree of 
difficulty experienced by producers seeking to supply that particular product to 
market. Prohibition as a supply reduction policy had little immediate impact on 




demand - tastes or incomes of consumers were not directly affected. As supply 
decreased the price of the product rose, and price sensitive consumers 
demanded a lesser quantity. Some consumers decided that the price point was 
too high or the difficulty of obtaining the product too prohibitive and so abstained 
from purchasing. Other consumers purchased less frequently or in lesser 
quantity. Consumers with the resources to continue previous patterns of 
consumption continued to support the market in the prohibited good.  
 
A study of the ‘heroin drought’ in Australia in the year 2000 reveals a little of the 
demand elasticity of drugs - the cost of a gram of heroin rose 75%, along with a 
corresponding drop in the perceived purity of the substance. This resulted in a 
drop in use amongst the respondents to the study of 36%.55 This represents a 
price elasticity relationship to demand of -0.48, meaning that for every 1% 
increase in the cost of heroin, demand reduced by about half a percent. This 
compares to modern analyses of alcohol demand-related price elasticity, which 
sets the coefficient at around -0.3.56 Given that the average behavioural effect of 
interventions is -0.24 this means that alcohol is only slightly more responsive than 
normal to price intervention.57  
 
The following graph may be of interest to those who are trained in economics: 
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Prohibition's Impact on the Consumer and Producer. 58 
 
Banning a substance can be analysed according to the costs versus the benefits 
of that ban. In its most simplistic terms the cost of a product versus the cost of 
enforcement gives the marginal cost of prohibition. Enforcement also has a 
diversionary cost - every dollar spent on prohibition enforcement means one less 
dollar that can be spent on alternative public policies such as national defence, 
housing for the homeless, or employment programs. If taxes are increased to fund 
prohibition enforcement, individuals will have less to spend on food, medical 
insurance, and leisure.  
 
At the declaration of Prohibition, theory indicates that the use of excess law-
enforcement capacity will have a significant effect on marginal users of the 
product, making expenditures on Prohibition enforcement highly effective. Initially 
enforcement resources will be diverted away from policies of lesser importance 
and enforcement will therefore be obtainable at a low cost. After these initial 
conditions, the price of additional enforcement will increase, its productivity 
decline, and the cost of expending resources increase. A 1990 study indicated 
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that increased efforts to suppress illegal drugs resulted in decreased enforcement 
efforts against property crime and thus an increase in it. For example, as more 
resources are devoted to prohibition enforcement, property crimes such as 
burglary become less risky and therefore increase in number.59 As complete 
enforcement is impractical, administrators of the National Prohibition Act of 1919 
will seek a cost-effective level of enforcement.60 
 
 
The Traditional Approach for Determining the Optimal Level of Prohibition 
Enforcement. 61 
 
Prohibition established an entrepreneurial gambling environment rather than one 
containing fixed and knowable costs such as tax. Participants who were caught 
faced lost revenue, fines, confiscations, and jail terms. Those not caught reaped 
large monetary profits. All the participants in the market incurred the costs of risk 
bearing. Sellers set their price point by evaluating the penalties and the likelihood 
of capture and conviction. In this calculation, the price of the product may be 
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considered as composed of three parts - the cost of procurement and distribution, 
the profit margin, and a prohibition surcharge to cover risk.  
 
In general, prohibitive statutes consistently define the illegalised product in terms 
of minimum potency rather than on a gradiential scale. Penalties are usually more 
severe according to the weight (or volume) of the shipment. Since penalties are 
based on weight, suppliers reduce the attributes that are not penalised when 
separated from the product. For instance it will be more risk-versus-reward 
effective to ship highly potency liquor with only 50% water by volume rather than 
beer that is 95% water by volume, as water does not attract a prohibition ‘tax’ - 
although shippers may expect to be fined on the entire quantity of the beverage.  
 
Enforcement of prohibition functions via surveillance. To avoid capture it is 
necessary to conceal the shipment. Whilst surveillance takes many forms, the 
size of the shipment is a basic factor. Size is related to volume and will act as a 
constant per-unit tax. This provides entrepreneurs an incentive to ship liquor of 
increased potency. These factors combine to increase potency and result in a 
higher shipped price. This explains the increase in the strength of the illegal liquor 
found when Prohibition enforcement agencies interdicted shipment. 
 




Total Expenditure on Distilled Spirits as a Percentage of Total Alcohol 
Sales (1890-1960) 62 
 
 
Observers of modern-day drug prohibition have noted that illegalisation tends to 
drive out weaker and milder forms of drugs, and to increase the availability and 
use of stronger and more dangerous drugs. So often has this been reported that 
many analysts speak of it as an ‘iron law’ of drug prohibition.63 This ‘law’ holds 
because milder drugs are commonly bulkier, harder to hide and smuggle, and 
less remunerative. It is therefore in the interest of drug entrepreneurs to do 
business in more compact and potent substances. For example, current 
interdiction efforts are most successful at capturing boats carrying bales of 
marijuana; therefore, many drug smugglers turn to smuggling cocaine or heroin 
because it is easier and far more lucrative than smuggling cannabis. 
 
Higher potency reduces the overall effectiveness of law enforcement because it 
means that smaller quantities represent greater effective amounts of the product. 
Higher-potency drugs are thought to be more dangerous and produce a greater 
risk to the health of the user. However, variance in the potency of a product poses 
a greater risk. In a 1989 study on the relegalisation of drugs James Ostrowski 
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claimed that 80 percent of the 3,000 deaths per year associated with heroin and 
cocaine were the result of the illegal nature of the market, not drug use as such.64 
In an illegal marketplace the potency of a product is not fixed, consumers have 
less reliable information about potency and added ingredients, and the producers 
cannot be held legally accountable for their product. 
 
Thornton argues that the higher price for illegal substances results in more 
criminal activity. If the demand for an illegal substance is relatively fixed then 
altering price will affect consumer income-seeking behaviour. The level of 
prohibition enforcement increases the price of the prohibited product, and 
therefore the real income of addicts and habitual users falls. The decreased real 
income resulting from prohibition makes illegal income more attractive to 
consumers seeking to pay for their now more expensive consumer goods. 
Opportunistic and systemic criminal income seeking behaviour is the result. For 
instance, as the price of heroin increases, real income falls. At this lower level of 
income the relative rewards of illegal income are enhanced. In response to this 
the individual will become more criminally active. Therefore, prohibition will induce 
some illegal substance consumers into other illegal activities such as drug dealing 
or robbery.65 
 
In summary then, the expected negative economic result of prohibition for society 
is: new criminal marketing opportunities; increased substance use risk by 
releasing producers from regulation and the obligation to abide by legally set 
minimum safety standards; and a trend towards more highly concentrated 
products. The anticipated negative economic outcomes for government is a 
decrease in taxation and excise receipts whilst government spending on 
enforcement increases as government resources are diverted towards particular 
types of enforcement. 
 
The positive economic results expected from Prohibition of alcohol were improved 
worker efficiency, less absenteeism, greater productivity and corresponding 
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increased government tax receipts, decreased healthcare costs, and savings on 
enforcement with the removal of the criminogenic action of alcohol. Unfortunately 
these results are predicated upon certain assumptions about the physical, social 
and psychological effects of alcohol. Accordingly, the veracity of these 
assumptions is briefly assessed. 
 
 
C Alcohol and health 
 
Does alcohol affect health, and if so, in a positive or negative way? This question 
has been debated for centuries, and is central to the both the desire of legislators 
seeking agitating to curtail alcohol consumption as well as those seeking its 
continued supply. Is alcohol an evil substance that threatens us all, or does it have 
medicinal and social properties that makes imbibing a blessing?66 
 
Controversy over the effects of alcohol consumption functions to cloud the issue 
medically, resulting in a mixed message from the medical establishment to 
politicians and constituents. In the 1920s the argument was vociferous, and even 
more controversial than climate change is today. The health effects of alcohol 
inform arguments regards productivity, medical costs, economic and social costs, 
and the politics of Prohibition. As this thesis is designed as the kernel of a policy 
document, modern research on the effects of alcohol in the body is explored in 
this subsection. 
 
When used for beverage purposes alcoholic drinks contain mixtures of 
deconcentrated alcohol. The effects of alcohol rarely result in the overdose death 
of the imbiber. As a socially acceptable drug that is customarily taken in low doses 
the effects are subtler. 
 
According to the World Health Organisation, an alcohol drinker has, on average, 
a shorter lifespan. The WHO estimates that the average worldwide decrease in 
                                            




life span due to alcohol is two years per hundred users of alcohol. To interpret 
these statistics - on average, the use of alcohol reduces the working life span of 
a drinker by seven days. This is in contrast to tobacco smokers who on average 
reduce their useful life span by 17 days.67 
 
For the purposes of comparison between a country with alcohol regulation and 
one with complete prohibition there follows alcohol statistics on the United States 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The yearly death rate in the United States from 
alcohol is 1.6 persons per year for every 100,000 people, a figure almost double 
that of Australia at 0.9 but half of Austria at 3.4.68 The official death rate from 
alcohol in Iran is zero, although this may be underestimated for ideological 
reasons. 
 
To test this assertion, consider the statistics generated by the World Health 
Organisation. The WHO estimates that 14.9 per 100,000 American men die from 
cirrhosis of the liver each year of which 60% is attributable to alcohol, about 14 
times that of the Islamic Republic of Iran.69 The WHO attributes approximately 1 
in 8 road traffic accidents involving American males to alcohol. In the Islamic 
Republic of Iran that figure is considerably less, about one in 29.70 This indicates 
that a country with reasonably effective alcohol prohibition has as much as a 
quarter of the problem drinkers of the USA. 
 
The Lancet in 2010 classified alcohol, of all of the drugs used throughout the 
world, as that drug which does the most harm.71 Minimising the damage of alcohol 
to the American people is a valid concern of the United States government, and 
of most countries throughout the world. 
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Alcohol is without doubt a dangerous substance capable of harming human 
health. Yet some studies have indicated that low to moderate use of alcohol can 
produce neutral or positive outcomes for the imbiber.73 74 At the turn of the 
millennium, it became popular to consider that there may be a health benefit from 
a moderate consumption of alcohol. The graph below indicates that consuming 
alcohol is healthier than abstention - even for those who consume six standard 
drinks per day, or about a bottle of wine.75 
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Later examinations of the evidence have thrown doubt upon this assertion, to the 
extent that it is no longer an accepted wisdom. Once problem drinkers who 
become abstemious for medical reasons are taken out of the equation, the 
apparent benefits of moderate alcohol consumption disappear.76 
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Alcohol - a substance linked to liver failure, cancer and behaviours resulting in 
injury and death. A substance that, in studies from as late as 2004, appeared to 
provide protection against coronary heart disease and mortality from all causes.77 
It is little wonder that alcohol facts are controversial - a ‘wicked’ knowledge.78 Note 
that the latest studies indicate that alcohol contains zero health benefit, absolutely 
none. Alcohol beverages of any kind are in no way a ‘health food’. 
 
Given that the above information it is possible to confidently predict that a 
diminution of the alcohol supply will result in greater productivity, decreased 
medical, economic and social costs, decreased harm to others and self, and in 
general a more harmonious, safer, and more abundant society. Is there any 




D Alcohol and society 
 
 ‘One drink is too many and a thousand is not enough’ — Alcoholics Anonymous aphorism.79 
 
There is also a controversy as to whether alcohol is of social and economic benefit 
or detriment. This section briefly examines this debate.  
 
Measuring the social value of alcohol is difficult. Some studies have attempted to 
render the social cost of alcohol in economic terms. The obvious losers from 
alcohol-related crime are the victims. An apparently straightforward approach to 
measuring the social cost of crime is to add up the damage to victims. Crime 
victims lose property, incur medical expense, miss time from work, and 
experience pain, suffering, disability, and residual fear, all of which they would 
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pay something to avoid if they could. In principle, we could try to calculate the 
direct financial as well as the ‘willingness-to-pay’ costs associated with the non-
monetary losses from victimisation to determine the total damage.80 It is 
debatable whether it makes much sense to ask someone, “What would you be 
willing to pay not to be bashed?” still less “What would you be willing to pay not 
to be raped?” 
 
Nevertheless, it is possible to assess alcohol use in a prosaic fashion, and present 
quantifiable monetary losses. In 2010, the Australian Government collected close 
to AU$8.6 billion from alcohol taxation.81 The total costs to Australian society of 
alcohol-related problems in 2010 is estimated at AU$14.352 billion. Of this, 
$2.958 billion (or 20.6%) represents costs to the criminal justice system, $1.686 
billion (or 11.7%) comprises costs to the health system, $6.046 billion (or 42.1%) 
involve costs to Australian productivity and $3.662 billion (or 25.5%) are costs 
associated with traffic accidents. This estimate of total costs, however, does not 
incorporate the negative impacts associated with someone else’s drinking, 
estimated at $6.807 billion.82 Taxation revenue therefore recovers only 2/5 of the 
overall economic cost of alcohol consumption to the Australian society. 
 
The alcohol tax revenue in the United States for the year 2000 was estimated at 
US$8.14 billion,83 rising to only $9.92 billion in 2014.84  The cost of alcohol from 
a health perspective was estimated in 1998 at US$185 billion. More than 70 
percent of the estimated costs of alcohol use for 1998 were attributed to lost 
productivity ($134.2 billion) including losses from alcohol-related illness ($87.6 
billion), premature death ($36.5 billion); and crime ($10.1 billion). The remaining 
estimated costs included health care expenditures ($26.3 billion, or 14.3 percent 
of the total), such as the costs of treating alcohol abuse and dependence ($7.5 
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billion) and the costs of treating the adverse medical consequences of alcohol 
consumption ($18.9 billion); as well as property and administrative costs of 
alcohol-related motor vehicle crashes ($15.7 billion, or 8.5 percent); and criminal 
justice system costs of alcohol-related crime ($6.3 billion, or 3.4 percent).85  
 
By these figures, the United States of America is recovering less than 1/20 of the 
economic cost of alcohol consumption through direct tax revenue. Note that the 
ancillary benefits of the alcohol industry - tourist revenue, employment and 
employee income tax benefits, company and corporate tax derived from the 
entertainment, hotel, club, restaurant, accommodation and liquor retailer 
industries are not included in this calculation. Not included is a quanta of the social 
benefits of drinking, even of heavy drinking - better conversational and joke-telling 
abilities, improved sexual encounters and more energy to stay up late partying 
and dancing.86  
 
There has been little investigation of the social benefits of alcohol consumption, 
reflecting perhaps an anhedonism bias in Western research. A 2012 study 
indicated that alcohol consumption enhances individual and group-level 
behaviors associated with positive affect, reduces individual-level behaviors 
associated with negative affect, elevates self-reported bonding and facilitates 
bonding during group formation.87  
 
It is difficult to obtain an overall benefit analysis of alcohol, with quantification of 
benefits particularly abstruse.  Social costs and benefits vary, with the seen 
benefit or detriment depending upon the viewpoint, interests and investment of 
the stakeholder concerned. This skews the calculation of the socio-economic cost 
benefit analysis of alcohol consumption, and the ‘knowledge’ derived becomes 
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unreliable. Without doubt, however, the social impost of alcohol is huge. The 
allure of alcohol that causes it to function as a personal and social lubricant is 
examined in the next section. 
 
 
E Alcohol and the mind 
 
Is alcohol sinner or saint? Alcohol is seductive yet socially problematic, at once 
offering relaxation and social ease whilst simultaneously sponsoring aggression 
and violence.88 What is it about this substance that causes people to respond to 
its administration in such different, even wicked, ways? 
 
The social effect of alcohol is best explained through the theory of ‘alcohol 
myopia’. People under the influence of alcohol find their attention restricted to the 
salient, immediate aspects of experience. Alcohol also reduces the brain’s 
processing capacity so that a greater proportion of this capacity has to be devoted 
to the demands of immediate, ongoing activity. Accordingly, when a drinker is 
doing something that requires attention and thought, alcohol myopia pressures 
him or her to attend to and think about that activity over less immediate worries. 
This means that during intoxication, a drinker may not have the processing 
resources to engage in a salient, ongoing activity like watching TV and at the 
same time brooding over his or her worries.89 
 
In effect, alcohol intoxication restricts the range of cues that we can perceive in a 
situation. When we are drunk, we simply attend to and encode fewer available 
cues, internal as well as external. Alcohol intoxication also reduces our ability to 
process and extract meaning from the cues and information that we do perceive. 
In social situations, alcohol can be a positive blessing - reducing anxiety whilst 
increasing spontaneity. In these same situations perceived slights can be 
intensified, causing the immediacy of anger to erupt into spontaneous violence. 
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Consuming alcohol creates in the imbiber an impoverished version of reality in 
which the breadth, depth, and time-line of our understanding is constrained. This 
state of short-sightedness causes superficially understood, immediate aspects of 
experience to have a disproportionate influence on our behavior and emotions – 
‘a state in which we can see the tree, albeit more dimly, but miss the forest 
altogether’.90 
 
Alcohol functions to disinhibit otherwise inhibited impulses. The immediacy of 
experience trumps considerations of verity, significance, and effects in both the 
present and future. 
 
Is alcohol sinner or saint? Ethanol is at once saint and sinner, lubricating social 
activities whilst simultaneously encouraging the cruellest abuses, as is discussed 
in section IV.H: Violence. A plethora of stakeholders in Prohibition advanced the 
view that alcohol is a daemon’s brew - sacramental or demonic depending upon 
perspective and the power of the prevailing opinion of the time. Alcohol is and has 
always been a controversial drug. The psychology of alcohol demonstrates why. 
 
With this perspective in mind it is possible to confidently predict that a diminution 
in the alcohol supply will cause a reduction in unpremeditated, domestic and mob 
violence, petty crime, and ensuing prison populations. Racist actions and abuses 
should decrease as should all manner of thoughtlessness.  
 
All of the preceding information sets the stage for an examination of Prohibition’s 
costs and benefits. Alcohol use damages health, has a large economic and social 
cost and increases the criminogenic potential of the population whilst 
simultaneously, in great moderation, is health neutral. Alcohol also relaxes and 
provides some social benefit; the alcohol business generates huge incomes when 
all its ancillary industries are considered, and employs millions. The degree to 
which the positive or negative effects of enforced alcohol abstinence dominated 
the American nation during the 1920s is examined in the following sections.  




III ECONOMIC FACTORS 
A Government Revenue 
 
In 1916, there were 1300 breweries producing full-strength beer in the United States; 10 years later there 
were none. Over the same period, the number of distilleries was cut by 85%, and most of the survivors 
produced little but industrial alcohol. Legal production of near beer used less than one tenth the amount of 
malt, one twelfth the rice and hops, and one thirtieth the corn used to make full-strength beer before National 
Prohibition. The 318 wineries of 1914 became the 27 in 1925. The number of liquor wholesalers was cut 
by 96% and the number of legal retailers by 90%. From 1919 to 1929, federal tax revenues from distilled 
spirits dropped from $365 million to less than $13 million, and revenue from fermented liquors from $117 
million to virtually nothing.91 
 
Reforms are of particular significance when they affect government revenue. This 
section examines the impact of liquor laws upon the government’s balance sheet, 
revealing this as a significant factor in any reform. 
 
In 1862, the US Federal government adopted the Internal Revenue Act. This Act 
taxed liquor to support the Union war effort and was significant for temperance 
leaders in that it allowed future arguments with antiprohibitionists to include 
reasoning that abolishing such legislation would cost the federal government 
money. Kansas Senator Samuel C. Pomeroy decried the Act as a "national 
licensing law" and called instead for national prohibition, the first such public call 
recorded. The tax proved so lucrative that soon after the law's passage the liquor 
tax comprised almost one fourth of federal government revenue.92 By 1875, one-
third of federal revenues came from taxing alcoholic beverages.93 
 
After the 1895 case Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company it required an 
amendment to the Constitution before Congress could levy a national income 
tax.94 After ratification of the 16th Amendment in 1913 income tax was a viable 
alternative to liquor taxation for raising revenue, thus making prohibition possible. 
By the fall of 1917, income tax was the chief source of federal government 
revenue.  Income tax’s ability to raise substantial government revenue reduced 
the cost to Congressmen of voting for prohibition in December 1917: liquor tax 
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revenues lost because of Prohibition were trivial in comparison with the rapidly 
growing revenues derived from individual and corporate income taxes. With these 
funds, politicians could redistribute wealth in the manner required to secure re-
election votes and contributions.  
 











1910    1911   1912     1913    1914     1915     1916    1917    1918     1919    1920 
 
Nevertheless, lost income became sizable. According to Okrent, the USA’s near 
neighbour was able to benefit greatly from Prohibition, where ‘liquor export taxes 
accounted for some 20 percent of all Canadian revenue collections ... in 1929, 
Canada’s alcohol export tax brought in twice as much as its income tax’.96 
 
The USA did manage to collect some revenue from the liquor trade during 
Prohibition. Okrent quotes the 1929 Prohibition commissioner, a chemist named 
James M. Doran, as saying that in Prohibition’s first nine years the government 
had spent some $141 million on all forms of enforcement while collecting more 
than $460 million in fines, penalties, and taxes.97 
 
During the 1920s, and especially the early 1930s, repeal advocates argued that 
ending prohibition would result in a windfall of revenues from taxes on alcohol 
sales and from money saved on enforcement.98 In a 1930 interview with 
Prohibition Commissioner Doran, he said; ‘... rough guesses, convince me that 
the booze bill of the average American adult before Prohibition was about $17 a 
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year. At present I believe this bill to be at least $35 a year, something over twice 
as much. That is how the bootleg barons get $3 billion a year ...’ 99 
 
The AAPA agreed, declaring in the pamphlet ‘Prohibition and the Deficit’ that: ‘by 
the end of 1931 annual liquor tax collections since 1920, if national prohibition 
had not intervened, should have totalled practically eleven billion dollars’.100 A 
platform of the AAPA was that, with revenue from an alcohol tax, repeal of the 
18th Amendment should result in a lowering of the income tax rate. Whilst this did 
not eventuate for those in the higher tax bracket, it was an argument that attracted 
sizable contributions from its more well-heeled members. 
 
The Great Depression of 1929 was a convincing argument to politicians that 
Government needed new sources of revenue - or perhaps to return to old ones. 
In 1932 the Democrats called for repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment in order ‘to 
provide therefrom a proper and needed revenue.’101 Prohibition interfered with 
Congress’s ability to redistribute wealth. Without first legalising alcohol, Congress 
could not easily collect tax revenues from liquor production and sales. Openly 
collecting taxes on bootleg liquor without repealing the Eighteenth Amendment 
would have too blatantly flouted the intent suggested by that Amendment’s 
addition to the Constitution. 
 
On December 5, 1933 the 21st Amendment, repealing the 18th, was ratified. Even 
though many states remained dry or severely limited the sale of alcohol, in the 
year of repeal 2% of federal government revenues were raised from liquor 
taxes.102 In 1934, the government collected $258,911,332 in alcohol taxes - nearly 
9% of total federal revenue, rising to 13% by 1936.103 Liquor taxation was not a 
perfect substitute for income taxation . . . liquor taxes following repeal did not fully 
compensate for reduced income tax revenues.  
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The revenue from income tax allowed the government to dispense with the 
alcohol excise and paved the way to Prohibition. The industrialists in the AAPA 
supporting repeal hoped that the revenue from alcohol taxation would win them 
lower income tax rates after Prohibition's end. Income tax rates did a fall, for all 
but the top earners. The levy paid by most workers earning $2,000 to $3,000 
annually dropped by a full 20 percent in the years immediately following Repeal. 
Much of the liquor revenue was treated by government as additive, helping to pay 
for new initiatives in the second half of Franklin Roosevelt’s first term.104 
 
Extrapolating Prohibition to the ‘war on drugs’, Boudreaux and Pritchard wrote 
this about politicians, saying that 
our analysis and common experience suggest that Congress is unlikely to repeal the 
drug laws simply because they do not achieve their publicly stated goal. Failure is by 
no means fatal to a social program when the government is running the show. As a 
strategic matter, we suggest that opponents of drug prohibition highlight the revenues 
that Congress could extract from a legalized trade in drugs. If our analysis is correct, 
money, not second thoughts about the war on drugs, will be the motive if and when 
Congress rethinks its policy.105  
 
To paraphrase Boudreaux and Pritchard, it is never a good idea to get between a 
politician and the bag of money that can be used to woo powerful stakeholders or 
marginal voters - whether achieved through discretion in handing out funds or 
targeted tax cuts. A lesson from Prohibition is that policy changes are not 
motivated by what nice people should want, but rather by electoral issues. 
 
Was the National Prohibition Act of 1919 of net benefit to US government 
revenues? Did government revenue rise with higher employment, higher wages, 
greater productive output and thus greater taxation revenue as a direct result of 
Prohibition? In 1926 the economist Professor Irving Fisher wrote: 
I have found that, beginning with prohibition, wages, the fluctuations of which had never 
exceeded 4% above or below the average level for 28 years, rose to a new level 28% 
above the old. Further it was found that profits had risen, and that savings achieved 
substantially greater growth in this prohibition period. Out of this 28% increase in wages 
and profits, I have ascribed only five to Prohibition.106 
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Fisher in 1926 declared that Prohibition added $6 billion to incomes each year,107 
worth $82 billion or about 4.5% of total income tax receipts in today’s money.108 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to isolate the effects of national alcohol abstention from 
other economic trends of the time. Until the economic crash of 1929 the 1920s 
was a period of high growth in credit availability and consumer spending. Other 
than Mr. Fisher’s economic analysis there are only anecdotal accounts of 
Prohibition’s positive effects, as examined further in section III.C. Business 
winners from prohibition. 
 
Businessmen appraised the reform of Prohibition with a view to economic 
advantage. Robert M. Davis of the Editorial Council, McGraw-Hill Publishing 
Company in New York wrote: 
It is as the "great business experiment" and as the "great business asset" that the 
American people must approach the 18th Amendment if it is to be ultimately and 
completely enforced in this nation. The moral side must be made subservient to the 
practical business side...109 
 
To what degree did Prohibition benefit business? The next sections discuss that 
practical business side in terms of the stakeholders who were the losers and 
winners from the implementation of Prohibition. The degree to which their 
individual losses or gains impacted upon the general weal is also considered. 
 
 
B Business losers from prohibition 
 
Prohibition destroyed businesses, destroyed jobs and devastated the way of life 
of millions of people. With the stroke of a pen, assets worth billions were made 
into millions. Traditions proudly held by people from many countries, practices 
that traditionally celebrated and controlled the use of alcohol were rendered 
underhand and illicit. Can this disruption to the culture and lifestyle of so many 
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people possibly be considered a successful consequence of the National 
Prohibition Act? 
 
There was discussion of compensation at the advent of Prohibition. Nationwide, 
the liquor and beer industries represented nearly $1 billion in invested capital, in 
combination the nation’s fifth largest industry. The influential magazine New 
Republic said any dry who argued against compensation was ‘exactly as mindful 
of property interests . . . as the Russian Bolsheviki.’ 110 At the time that national 
prohibition was being debated there occurred in 1917 the Russian Revolution, 
overthrowing the landholding nobility. American holders of land and capital were 
naturally concerned over any move by government that might violate their right to 
the continued possession of property.  
 
In 1922 Episcopalian Reverend W. A. Crawford-Frost preached from the pulpit 
supporting this view, saying:  
The Volstead Act robbed thousands of men whose capital was invested in what they 
considered to be an honorable industry and one that promoted the health and 
happiness of mankind on the whole, even though five per cent injured themselves by 
it. It robbed them by taking away their property from them without compensation. It 
robbed their employees of their living by throwing them out of work. It robbed the 
taxpayers, who now have to pay out of their own pockets by compulsion the billions of 
dollars that were formerly spent cheerfully and voluntarily by the users of alcoholic 
beverages.111 
 
The Episcopalian sect of Protestantism was dominated by those who were ‘well 
off’ - it was not a working class institution. 
Some were more sanguine about the loss of property rights. Representative 
Daniel E. Garrett of Texas said, ‘I doubt if any man deplores more than myself 
that the institution of slavery ever existed in this country . . . as it has been with 
human slavery, so shall it be with alcoholic liquors.’ Therefore, he argued, the 
liquor and beer interests ‘must pocket their loss just as our fathers had to pocket 
theirs when you took their niggers away from them. That is all there is to it.’112 
Section 4 of the 14th Amendment specifically prohibited compensation for the loss 
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or emancipation of any slave.113 Representative Garrett’s statement, coming as it 
does from a southern state that desired to keep slaves as property, can be seen 
as part of the struggle between South and North - Southerners were not the main 
holders of alcohol production facilities. This struggle is further examined in section 
IV.C: State Federal Relations. 
 
Compensation for the liquor industry was not forthcoming, but for different 
reasons to those which resulted in the emancipation of slaves without due 
payment. The Supreme Court followed the 1887 ruling in Mugler v. Kansas: ‘A 
prohibition upon the use of property for purposes that are declared by valid 
legislation to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community is not 
an appropriation of the property for the public benefit’.114 In Hamilton v. Kentucky 
Distilleries & Warehouse Co. (1919) 251 U.S. 146, Brandeis, writing for a 
unanimous Court, upheld a wartime ban on the sale of liquor against the claim 
that the ban constituted an unconstitutional taking of private property.115 The 
ruling was almost opposed by Justice Holmes who balked on 'Due Process' - the 
principle that, while property may be regulated by the government to a certain 
extent, if regulation goes too far, it will be recognised as a taking.116 Mugler v. 
Kansas’s ruling was reiterated in the 1920 case Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey.117  
 
Despite the vain hope of some brewers that mid-strength beer could be declared 
non-intoxicating, the entire alcohol beverage industry was crushed. There was no 
compensation, the cost of which would have made the Prohibition reform 
prohibitively expensive. The underlying raison d'être for the existence of law and 
the institutions of society is their operation to further the public interest, a concept 
beyond the scope of this thesis. In Mugler v. Kansas the Supreme Court ruled 
that once the legislature decrees that an activity is contrary to the public interest 
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then that activity may be extinguished without compensation to those whose 
property interests are damaged by the cessation of the activity. 
 
The extent to which the advent of Prohibition was injurious to the American public 
is difficult to gauge. Whilst the brewing and distilling industries may have been 
concentrated in ownership the alcohol production, distribution and sales network 
employed a large number of people. Interestingly, employment data is not 
available for this period. Recorded discussions over the destruction of the alcohol 
beverage industry reflect little interest in the many people who lost their 
livelihoods; nevertheless, an extrapolation can be made. In 2010, one estimate of 
the beverage industries’ employment levels was about 4 million people.118 If the 
proportion of the population employed in this industry is retrogressively 
maintained then in 1919 the beverage industry directly employed over 1% of the 
US population. 
 
The reformers, of course, argued that the cessation of spending on alcoholic 
products would lead to a growth of jobs in other areas. According to this argument 
even the industrial plant, distribution and sales systems of the alcohol industry 
would not be a complete loss to the economy. Some stakeholders would step into 




C Business winners from prohibition 
 
One hundred and ten millions of people do not continue to make fools of themselves for long. They are the 
most prosperous people under the sun, not because they have the gold but because they have not the drink.119 
 
In 1895 Asa Candler, the owner of the Coca-Cola Company began running 
advertisements in newspapers that said, ‘Drink Coca-Cola, the Great National 
Temperance Drink, Delicious and Refreshing’. Candler used the term ‘soft drink’ 
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to distinguish Coca-Cola and other mineral water leisure drinks from drinks 
containing alcohol.120 The soft drink industry grew rapidly. In 1900 there were 
2,763 soft drink manufacturers collecting more than $23 million dollars in 
revenues. By 1919, total sales revenues surpassed $135 million.121 Given that 
government lost $352 million in revenue from alcohol, taxes on soft drinks did a 
little to make up the difference. 
 
Tea merchants, soda fountain manufacturers, candy manufacturers, car dealers, 
ice cream venders, members of the motion picture industry and those in other 
leisure trades generally supported Prohibition, thinking a ban on alcohol would 
increase sales of their products.122 Sadly, from the onset of Prohibition the many 
investors in breweries took a considerable loss, some selling their assets to soft 
drink entrepreneurs for as little as ten cents to the dollar. A very few brewers 
converted their machinery themselves, reopening as soft drink producers. After 
sales plummeted, and local and state temperance regulation intensified, 
Galveston Brewing Company closed in 1916. During the next two years, the GBC 
converted its brewing equipment to produce soft drinks and in 1918, the Southern 
Beverage Company opened its doors with its new product, Triple XXX Root 
Beer.123  
 
The primary source of motivation for commercial stakeholders in favour of 
prohibition was productivity. Of concern to businessmen was the increasing use 
of machinery in industry - the intemperate worker, once merely inefficient, 
threatened profitability through industrial accidents. For safety reasons many 
industrial concerns did not employ problem drinkers. The American Railway 
Association enforced ‘Rule G’, which called for the dismissal of operating 
employees who drank on duty or even frequented saloons. A number of other 
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businesses followed suit in the widespread belief that sobriety and industrial 
safety were inseparable.124  
 
The cost of alcohol was also perceived as a factor in driving up wages. In 1914  
Dr. Thomas Darlington, a former New York City health commissioner who had 
gone to work for the steel industry’s trade association, said: ‘the use of liquor has 
a direct bearing upon wages; if a man is addicted to alcohol he wants more money 
for the family’.125 Mr. Clarence S. Darrow in 1909 explained this tension between 
the needs of industry and that of the working man: 
There is a law governing wages which says that wages tend to come down to the lowest 
price that will keep men alive and permit them to propagate their kind. They have to be 
kept alive in order to do the rich man's work, and they have to raise a family so that the 
rich people in the next generation can have their work done.126 
 
As Munger & Schaller wrote, ‘industrialists had morals on their tongues, but labor 
productivity on their minds’.127 
 
In section III:A this thesis explored the effect of productivity gains on government 
revenue, however it is worth reprising. The results of Prohibition appear to 
validate the industrialists’ point of view. Economic success in the 1920s was also 
popularly associated with temperance:  
It is plain that the economic gain due to prohibition is enormous. Professor Fisher of 
Yale estimates this to be a total gain of $6,000,000,000 annually - that is, six thousand 
million dollars to be placed on the credit side of the ledger every twelve months, or five 
hundred million every month. 128 
 
A growth in sales receipts appeared to support this estimate:  
Woolworth’s sales in 1925 were 42 per cent of the total sales for the six years prior to 
prohibition, Kresge's were 61 per cent, Kress' 44 per cent, and McCrory's 64 per cent. 
. . . It must be admitted that the bulk of the sales in the 5 and 10 cent stores is made to 
the laboring people, and the enormous increase in sales reflects the greatly improved 
economic condition of our workers and their families.129 
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Anecdotal evidence abounded of productivity gains due to Prohibition, as is 
consistent with the theories discussed in chapter II will. President of the Illinois 
Steel Company, E. J. Buffington, attributed the prohibition law with being one of 
the principal causes of a new steel production high record in March 1925. 
Buffington also said, ‘The men, because of prohibition, are more contented, and 
homelife is improved. The women tell us that they receive more money for the 
home and for clothing and for other domestic uses, and everybody seems to be 
happy.’ Buffington turns from considerations of his workers to the state of the 
industry: 
Our opinion of the influence of prohibition upon our employees is that the employees 
report for work with greater regularity, resulting in a decrease in the percentage of labor 
turnover; that the average efficiency of employees has increased; that personal injuries, 
due to accidents at the mills, have decreased, and the average economical condition 
of employees’ families is improved.130 
 
In a similar vein, a 1925 report by Simms & Coventry Ltd, tinplate manufacturers 
claimed: ‘Prohibition has increased the efficiency of American workmen by 20 per 
cent’.131  
 
Joseph Gusfield applied the term ‘moral athleticism’ to describe the ideology of 
the temperance movement, an ideology finding its expression in improved 
industrial might, and better consumer outcomes for workers and merchants.132  
 
Richard H. Scott, president of the Reo Motor Car Company in Michigan wrote: 
Instead of dulled minds, unsteady muscles, and jumping nerves after the holiday of 
Saturday afternoon and Sunday, the workers began the week on Monday with full 
power. . . Prohibition created new markets for our products. New standards of living 
were set nineteen per cent higher than when Prohibition arrived, according to Secretary 
[of Commerce Herbert] Hoover. Instead of a pail of beer, the worker bought oil and 
gasoline. Better homes, better furniture, better clothes, more amusement were 
demanded. The wage check that once went into the bartender’s till began to travel to 
the local merchant.133 
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Absenteeism was a metric by which much of the initial success of Prohibition was 
measured. Whilst there are no figures for absenteeism before Prohibition, there 
is much enthusiastic anecdotal evidence. Worker absenteeism was considered a 
primary cause of a lack of economic efficiency – a major industrialist told 
Prohibition Commissioner Haynes, ‘before the Volstead Act, we had 10% 
absenteeism after pay day. Now it is not over 3%.’134  
 
Henry Ford wrote to the Pictorial Review, saying:  
With booze in control we can count on only two or three effective days work a week in 
the factory - and that would destroy the short day and the five-day week which sober 
industry has introduced. When men were drunk two or three days a week, industry had 
to have a ten or twelve-hour day and a seven-day week. With sobriety the working man 
can have an eight-hour day and a five-day week with the same or greater pay. ... I 
would not be able to build a car that will run 200,000 miles if booze were around, 
because I wouldn’t have accurate workmen. To make these machines requires that the 
men increase their skill.135 
 
R.H. Scott, general manager of the Reo Motor Car Company, agreed:  
Under the open saloon plan, large numbers of our employees would be absent from 
one to three days following each pay day. This left many machines idle, and 
disorganized our production to such an extent that provision  had  to  be  made  to make 
up for the  inefficiency  of  the  employees  who were  absent on account of 
drunkenness.136 
 
D. Seltzer, general manager, Ohio Cultivator Company, also reported:  
We have now (1922) in our employ  a  number  of  men  who were  habitually  off  from  
one  to  three days  after  each  pay day and their records now show that they have 
missed practically no  time  for  over  a year.137 
 
Henry M. Leland of Detroit said:  
For years previous to the passage of this Amendment (Eighteenth), on each Monday 
morning there were from three hundred to five hundred men absent endeavoring to 
sober up from the effects of the Saturday night  and  Sunday  drinking and debauchery. 
This was a most serious and difficult situation to handle and keep the plant operating 
advantageously. 
 
When the Amendment was adopted, Mr. Leland was head of the Lincoln 
Automobile Company. Of this period, he says, ‘Immediately after it (Eighteenth 
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Amendment) went into effect, this Monday morning delinquency was entirely 
eliminated.  Monday morning became like any other morning - the men all at 
work’.138  
 
W.T. Beatty, president of the Austin Manufacturing Company, Chicago, wrote in 
1922:  
When I see the long row of doggerel  saloons that  partially surrounded our own and 
other  factories  but  a year  or two ago and think of the low-browed  gang  that  
contended with our working men for their wages before they could  get home  with  them  
to  their  families,  and the scenes of  violence and crimes of every sort which occurred 
on pay nights, I am amazed that  any  decent  intelligent  man  should  want  to  return 
to  such  conditions.139 
 
Alcohol was also associated with industrial unrest. John G. Cooper, Ohio 
Congressman and a member of the railroad union wrote,  
Alcohol is a mighty inflammable substance. Put it in the mind of a worker with a 
grievance and something is going to burn. Too often it was the worker who got burned. 
Strikes are costly. They are the ultimate weapon of labor, just as war is the ultimate 
weapon of nations, but today we arbitrate instead of striking and we are making steady 
advances toward industrial justice. The chip fell from labor’s shoulder when the beer 
pail dropped from labor’s hand.140 
 
As the decade wound down the positive effects of Prohibition eroded. A 1930 
survey asked industrialists about the absence or tardiness of workers on Mondays 
and the days following paydays. Of the 287 responses less than half felt that there 
was considerable improvement in absenteeism. One-third of the respondents who 
did detect decreased absenteeism did not attribute this improvement to 
Prohibition. Some employers even reported higher absenteeism and did attribute 
this increase to Prohibition. One employer is reported as saying that ‘the stuff 
available to labor, and there is plenty of it, is so rotten that it takes the drinking 
man two or three days to get over his spree’.141 
 
The lack of verifiable data on productivity and absenteeism makes a precise 
evaluation of the effects of Prohibition in these areas difficult; however, anecdotal 
evidence appears to indicate that absenteeism decreased in the years 
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immediately after enactment, then grew as other, more poisonous sources of 
alcoholic beverages came online. This is consistent with the health effects of 
alcohol, as discussed in II:C. The tenor of the times appears to indicate that 
productivity followed the same pattern as absenteeism, also consistent with 
theory. There is only Professor Fisher’s evidence and Woolworths figures as to 
the effect of Prohibition on spending, although the soft drink industry certainly 
experienced high growth during this period. The effects of Prohibition as a reform 
were intertwined with a period of general economic exuberance before the black 
dog of the Great Depression seemingly invalidated previous arguments over the 
economic effect of Prohibition. 
 
 
D Business winners after repeal 
 
After Repeal of the 18th Amendment, there is little data on absentee rates, levels 
of productivity or healthcare costs. It was a confused time of economic 
depression, government cutbacks and Roosevelt’s New Deal. What we do know 
is that from 1934 the alcohol beverage industry became increasingly dominated 
by a few large players, perhaps because of state government regulation. In the 
hurly-burly of countrywide calamity, concerns over alcohol use ‘fell off the radar’. 
Perhaps this is also due to the AAPA and the alcohol beverage industry who were 
successful in ‘controlling the narrative’ and making alcohol prohibition a dead 
issue. 
 
Businessmen moved with the times. On December 5, 1933, Utah became the 
thirty-sixth state to ratify the Repeal amendment, removing the federal 
government’s authority to enforce Prohibition.  Less than twenty-four hours later 
waitresses served beer in the dining room at Henry Ford’s Dearborn Inn outside 
Detroit. Four years earlier Ford had vowed to shut down his factories if drink ever 
came back. The New York Times said that this ‘caused many of those present to 
speculate on what Mr. Ford’s future policy would be.’ Less than three months later 
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Henry Ford’s began an advertising campaign touting the suitability of Ford trucks 
for the booming brewery business.142 
 
Of the 1,345 American brewers who had been operating in 1915, 31 resumed 
operations within three months of the return of legal beer - primarily the big 
companies that had retooled production for ice cream or cheese or malt syrup. 
Beer, as a bulky and perishable product, required quick and local distribution. This 
produced a more diverse industry nationally, yet still monopolised by region or 
area. Although several hundred firms returned to the business in the ensuing 
years, a consolidation of the market occurred such that by 1935 five companies 
controlled 14 percent of the market. By 1958, their market share reached 31 
percent; by 2009, further consolidation produced three survivors owning 80 
percent.143 
 
Distillers experienced similar consolidation. By the end of the 1930s roughly four-
fifths of all distilled liquor made in the United States was manufactured by four 
corporations. Why this level of industry consolidation? Levine and Reinarman 
consider that regulatory agencies prefer to deal with a few large corporations - 
such consolidation makes their operations easier to police and agreements with 
industry players can be reached with greater alacrity and ease. These few players 
are more likely to agree to keep the image of the industry clean and respectable. 
This form of monopolisation was not unique to the alcohol beverage industry - 
most major American industries went through a period of consolidation that 
resulted in increasing domination by a few large corporations. From the time of 
the National Recovery Act at the start of the New Deal, federal government policy 
acted to encourage such concentration. If the alcohol industry was exceptional, it 
is only in how quickly many small producers were overtaken by a few dominant 
ones.144 
 
The centralisation of power within the industry as well as the spread of the 
perception that ‘Prohibition was a failure’ effectively inoculated the industry 
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against contemporary social movements such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving 
(MADD) that might function to damage the profitable operation of these 
businesses.145 The business winners after repeal were those few, large well-
resourced beverage producers who had survived Prohibition such as Pabst, Miller 
and Busch. It is incorrect to consider that bootleggers who were able to keep and 
consolidate their gains leveraged their fortunes to become some of the foremost 
families in American life. The Kennedy family’s interest in the liquor business 
operated from the time of Repeal; the only other family to achieve its enduring 
fortune during Prohibition was that of Sam Bronfman, and he was Canadian.146 
 
The post-repeal environment was one that sought to avoid the excesses of the 
pre-Prohibition era, and government did this through regulation. A regulated 
environment, as opposed to one that allows more laissez-faire operations, favours 
a centralisation of ownership. The larger a corporate entity, the easier and more 
cost-effective is its dealings with regulatory regimes. Whilst a regulatory 
environment tends to stifle innovation and create barriers to new market entries, 
it also favours large players and a concentration of capital - interestingly, this is 
an antidemocratic outcome.147 The post-Repeal environment then may be 
considered as one that fostered a slightly more tyrannical state - a matter outside 
the scope of this thesis. 
 
 
E Prohibition and development 
 
This section argues that a prohibition environment reduces economic activity, 
growth and development in states that practice policies that limit mutually 
beneficial exchanges. Whilst the evidence for this is scanty, it represents a point 
for further investigation.  
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Antiprohibitionist Joseph Debar in his essay ‘The Effects of Prohibition on the 
Development of States’ examined evidence from Census reports and cherry 
picked the following results:  
Among States ... similarly situated geographically, and with the same density of 
population per 242 square mile, the prohibition States have shown during the period in 
which they were subject to the law an increase in population much smaller than that of 
the non-prohibition States. The decrease in growth in the newer States of Iowa, Kansas, 
South Dakota and North Dakota ... is most remarkable, since all the conditions of those 
States ... were of the character most conducive to rapid development. 
 
Debar goes on to write:  
Iowa, which had increased in population 36 per cent, between 1870 and 1880, under 
license, increased only 17 per cent, between 1880 and 1890, under prohibition, while 
in Kansas the increase in growth fell from 173 per cent., between 1870 and 1880, under 
license, to 43 per cent between 1880 and 1890, and to less than 4 per cent, between 
1890 and 1900, under prohibition. The increase in population in South and North 
Dakota, between 1880 and 1890, when they had license, was over 278 per cent. 
Prohibition went into effect in these States in 1890.148 
 
Perhaps a free trade of goods and services in mutually beneficial exchanges aids 
development, and a restrictive regime decreases the economic attractiveness of 
an area to potential migrants. This question is, however, beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
 
This thesis will now speak to the enforcement side of Prohibition in its economic 
and social practicality, of public sentiment, and administrative capacity. 
 
  
                                            





By means of a wise police, the sovereign accustoms the people to order and obedience.149 
A Introduction 
This chapter discusses the important factors affecting an efficient enforcement of 
the Act. It also examines the metrics by which enforcement is measured, and 
assesses Prohibition’s likely real effect upon the statistics and reports of the time. 
 
Various issues functioned to degrade effective enforcement of the National 
Prohibition Act. For political reasons the Act was poorly administered. For further 
political reasons the Act’s implementation was flawed. These influences 
functioned to diminish but not abolish the expected gains flowing from the 18th 
Amendment. This was seen in the eventually mediocre operation of the Act and 
its effect upon drunkenness and levels of alcohol use, its effect upon crime and 
in particular violent crime, and its flow-through effects upon prison populations 
and judicial workloads. The politics of Prohibition provided opportunities for 
corruption - in the end, if the Act is to be seen as a failure then that failure is one 
of political will rather than some inherent impossibility of enforcement. This is 
explored in the following sections. 
 
 
B The Act, and its Administration 
 
The elimination of disorder will be the function of the police.150 
 
The aims and success of legislation are inseparable from its execution. This 
thesis employs the premise that the goal of law enforcement is compliance, and 
the actions and effects of compliance officers are an indissoluble part of a 
legislative initiative. Those who are non-compliant with the law are ‘deviant’, and 
                                            
149 E de Vattel, Traduccion de Fernando Murillo Rubiera; Vease Le Droit Des Gens Ou Principes de La Loi 
Naturelle Appliquee a La Conduite et Aux Affaires Des Nations et Des Souverains (Londres, 1768) 162. 
150 M Foucault et al, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978 (St 




physically arresting this deviance is the role of the police. Traditionally, ‘deviance’ 
is considered an integral part of human nature - in 1910, the antiprohibitionist 
Joseph Debar wrote: ‘The fruit of only one tree in the Garden of Eden was 
forbidden, yet Adam and Eve ate of that tree’.151 The 1920s enforcement of 
Prohibition describes the management of those deviating from compliance with a 
new law, the National Prohibition Act. This section will examine the important role 
of popular acceptance in a widespread reform such as the Prohibition, and 
explore the difficulties the Act experienced in its administration. 
 
When examining the popular acceptance of a law, perhaps most of all it is the 
behavioural qualities of the target population that functions to determine criminal 
law efficacy. To quote Mark Kleiman:  
In a group of generally well-behaved individuals, enforcement can concentrate on a 
small number of miscreants, delivering swift and certain sanctions, and the resulting 
high probability that any offense will lead to punishment will make misbehavior an 
unattractive option. The same amount of enforcement attention applied to a badly 
behaved population will lead to only delayed and sporadic punishment, because the 
level of offending will “swamp” the enforcement response. As individuals learn that the 
most likely result of offending is getting away with it, offense rates will tend to rise, 
aggravating the inadequacy of the enforcement response. Both high and low levels of 
offending will be self-sustaining, and increases and decreases in offending levels will 
tend to be self-reinforcing.152  
 
Prohibition was a reform seeking to change the pattern of behaviour of many 
people. An old therapists’ joke illustrates the difficulty: ‘How many psychologists 
does it take to change a light bulb? Answer: just one, but the light bulb really has 
to want to change.’ In the opinion of Episcopal Church clergyman Reverend 
William A. Wasson:  
Law enforcement is, in the long run, dependent on public sentiment. Moreover, public 
sentiment, in order to make itself felt, must be active, alert and persistent. A mere vague 
wish that the law be enforced is not enough. The wish must be followed up by well-
organized effort. 
 
Wasson goes on to say: ‘A stringent, harsh sumptuary law, like prohibition, could 
not be enforced unless it had on its side an almost unanimous public sentiment, 
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vigilant and well-organized’.153 The apparatus of hegemonic propaganda 
performs the task of organising public sentiment. Enforcing that hegemony is a 
role shared by police, bureaucracy, religious bodies, employers and labour unions 
- indeed any locus of governmentality can be engaged to impose order and 
discipline. The National Prohibition Act was not implemented in an environment 
of unanimous public sentiment. 
 
As the 18th Amendment was undergoing ratification Yale Professor of Law, soon 
to be Chief Justice and ex-President William Howard Taft presciently wrote that 
the Amendment:  
will be adopted against the views and practices of a majority of people in many of the 
large cities ... The business of manufacturing alcohol, liquor and beer will go out of the 
hands of law-abiding members of the community and will be transferred to the quasi-
criminal class.154  
 
This is precisely, of course, what occurred. 
 
There were difficulties in enforcement, and in generating a national system of 
policing Prohibition. In 1928 Political scientist McBain wrote, ‘a gigantic national 
police force is antipathetical to our federal scheme of things. Such a force is 
nevertheless the plain logic of national prohibition.’155 Unfortunately, the plain 
logic is that a huge national enforcement body, later to briefly become part of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, takes time to train and build. As said the 
Wickersham Commission: ‘The subjects of federal penal legislation had been 
relatively few and either dealt with along well settled common law lines, or 
narrowly specialized. There was no federal police power ... Inadequate 
organization and equipment have resulted.’156 
 
The  one year delay  between  the  passing  of  the  National Prohibition Act  and  
its  implementation was spent setting up  some  of the new law enforcement 
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machinery, for which Congress had earmarked $3 million, equivalent to US$41 
million in today’s money. As a sense of comparison, this allocation is about what 
buyers paid in one day a few months later for muskrat pelts at the St. Louis fur 
auction.157 The delay in implementation also provided officers of the Customs and 
Internal Revenue Services opportunity to train for their new duties. In terms of 
manpower, the new Prohibition Unit (soon to be called the Prohibition Bureau) 
recruited a mere 1,500 agents.158 Similarly, in 1920 the entire Coast Guard fleet 
consisted of twenty-six inshore vessels, some converted tugboats, and twenty-
nine cruising cutters.159 
 
American geography contributed significantly to the Coast Guard’s difficulties in 
enforcing prohibition. The USA boasts almost 12,000 miles of Atlantic, Pacific and 
Gulf shoreline, abounding in inlets, much of it adjacent to unoccupied tracts 
offering every facility to the smuggler. Chief sources of supply from the outside 
are immediately accessible along nearly 3,000 miles of boundary on the Great 
Lakes and connecting rivers. There are 3,700 miles of land boundaries running 
along Canada and Mexico. The terrain of valleys, mountains, lakes and swamps 
in relatively close proximity to cities allow illicit liquor manufacturers steady and 
profitable markets for their produce.160 
 
The National Prohibition Act provisions also complicated the work of the Bureau.  
Whilst agents of the bureau were responsible for tracking down the illegal 
production of alcohol, the Volstead Act reinforced the federal statute relating to 
search and seizure by adding a clause making issuance of any warrant 
dependent on proof that the liquor was for sale. No matter how much liquor a 
person had at home, no matter how it was obtained or what use was intended, 
agents had to have positive evidence that a commercial transaction was 
involved.161 This burden made proving an offence difficult. Why did the foremost 
lobby group driving the 18th Amendment, the Anti-Saloon League (ASL), choose 
to add this proviso? The answer is in perceived public sentiment. 
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Whilst possession of liquor illegally obtained was unlawful, the act of drinking was 
maintained as privileged. The league and other defenders of the 18th Amendment 
wished to avoid any suggestion that they supported sumptuary laws – ‘Laws 
made for the purpose of restraining luxury or extravagance’.162 The provision also 
addressed a popular concern over ‘the dry snooper and killjoy on the prowl to 
mind someone else's business’.163 Whilst the capacity to surveille and then ‘mind 
someone else’s business’ is an important characteristic enhancing the hegemonic 
power of civil society, the ASL did not consider that public sentiment was as yet 
in favour of empowering the snooping killjoy to prosecute the cause of Prohibition. 
 
Coordination of prohibition forces is an important factor in effective enforcement. 
The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, in his Annual Report to the 
Secretary of the Treasury for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1919 wrote:  
No law can be effectively enforced except with the assistance and cooperation of the 
law-abiding element. The Bureau will accordingly put into operation at once the 
necessary organization to cooperate with the states and the public in the rigid 
enforcement of the prohibition law, and appeals to every law-abiding citizen for support. 
This contemplated end requires the closest cooperation between the Federal officers 
and all other law-enforcing officers, state, county, and municipal.164 
 
As discussed in section IV.C: State Federal Relations, this cooperation was not 
universally forthcoming. 
 
Modern media myths perpetuate the idea that Prohibition enforcement was a 
corrupt occupation rife with danger. Despite the inadequacy of organisation, the 
enforcement arm was not idle during Prohibition nor was its work exceptionally 
dangerous. Going by the number of Prohibition kills and a population of about 120 
million people in 1928, the policing of Prohibition was a reasonably safe affair as 
the following figures indicate. The records of the Prohibition Bureau list the names 
of 126 persons, mostly citizens, who were killed by prohibition officers from 
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January 16, 1920, to May 15, 1928. During this same period, 49 prohibition and 
2 narcotic officers were killed. The records of the Immigration Bureau disclose the 
names of 7 immigration officers killed and, while there is no record of the number 
killed by immigration officers, a conservative estimate places the figure at 
approximately 100, mostly aliens, who were shot near the Mexican border. In the 
customs service the records include the names of 8 officers killed in gunfights or 
in pursuing persons alleged to be violating the prohibition law. Twenty-one 
persons were killed by customs officers. The records of the United States Coast 
Guard disclose the names of 4 guardsmen killed, and 5 persons killed.165 Overall 
this is about 240 people over an eight year period (excluding aliens), or about 30 
people per year killed as a result of drug and alcohol prohibition activity - about 
half of whom were enforcement officers. 
 
Compare this with modern times. In 2012, the US population was about 314 
million. In 2012, internal drug enforcement activity resulted in the reported death 
of 63 people, and only eight of these were enforcement officers.166 Whilst the 
population increased over 2 ½ times in a period of 84 years the number of people 
killed through Prohibition-style policing has doubled. On a per capita basis 1920s 
Prohibition drug and alcohol enforcement was only slightly more dangerous than 
in the present day. These figures do not reflect a Hollywood induced perception 
of the 1920s as a bloody and lawless period. It does however indicate that for 
enforcement officers modern USA is considerably safer than the USA of 
Prohibition, and somewhat less safe for civilians involved in the trade of prohibited 
substances. 
 
We may also compare the comparative expenditures on drug and alcohol 
Prohibition between the 1920s and the present day. In 1927 United States District 
Attorney Buckner, of New York, estimated that it would require an appropriation 
of at least $75,000,000 a year to restrain the commercialised alcohol supply 
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industry in the State of New York.167 This amount, US $1 billion in today’s money, 
was considered a prohibitive sum. In 1930 the Wickersham commission stated 
that the only increase required: 
is that there should be 60 per cent more agents and 60 per cent more storekeeper-
gaugers, that the number of prohibition investigators and special agents should be 
doubled, that there should be a proportionate increase in the Customs Bureau, and in 
the equipment of all enforcement organizations, and that the number of assistant district 
attorneys should be increased.168 
 
The following table of appropriations and expenditures includes the 
appropriations for the narcotic unit, which was operated as a part of the Prohibition 
Unit or Bureau but with separate personnel. The appropriation for the narcotic unit 





These figures do not represent the total expenditures for prohibition enforcement. 
The expenditures for the Bureau of Customs, Coast Guard and other services 
directly or indirectly connected with prohibition enforcement many of which have 
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been necessarily increased to a greater or less extent to meet the additional 
burdens imposed by the National Prohibition Act, do not appear in the above 
figures. 
 
To obtain an idea of the comparative expenditures, at its highest point in 1930 the 
United States federal government spent approximately US$15 million on narcotic 
and alcohol prohibition enforcement, an amount worth approximately US$200 
million in 2014.170 In 2014 the appropriations request from The Drug Enforcement 
Authority was US$2 billion.171 The US population in 1930 was approximately 123 
million people.172 By 2014 the population was approximately 320 million persons, 
a growth of 260%. Expenditure on federal substance prohibition grew 1000%. By 
this measure the US Federal government, in real terms, is spending 
approximately 4 times as much per capita on enforcing the prohibition of illegal 
drugs and alcohol as it did in 1930.  
 
These 2014 figures do not include the concurrent enforcement by the individual 
states of America, states where drug-related incarcerations are approximately 
16% of the prison population.173 Miron in a 2008 study estimated the total cost of 
drug enforcement expenditure in America at $41.3 billion, an amount worth $3.8 
billion in 1930’s money.174 The ‘prohibitive sum’ of $75 million (now equivalent to 
$1 billion) a year cited by Attorney Buckner to restrain the commercialised alcohol 
supply industry in the State of New York is comparable to today’s expenditure on 
drug control. An amount in 1927 that indicated the impracticality of alcohol 
prohibition enforcement is today regularly spent, year after year, on drug 
prohibition. 
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The perspective that hiring more police, making more arrests and incarcerating 
more people will reduce crime is challenged by Dills, Miron, and Summers in their 
work ‘What Do Economists Know about Crime?’ In this article the authors provide 
various explanations as to the limited effect of incarceration on criminal 
deterrence, saying: ‘it might be that some criminals do not regard prison as worse 
than life outside or view the negative impacts on their future lives once released 
as small.’ Accordingly, the deterrence model may have limited impact: ‘Criminals 
may be people with high discount rates and/or myopic preferences, in which case 
the threat of future punishment should play a relatively small role.’ They conclude 
that, ‘increases in the standard deterrence variables have small or perverse 
effects over the relevant range’.175 Michel Foucault theorised that incarceration 
has as its primary purpose, not deterrence or rehabilitation, but the production of 
a more easily managed population of delinquents, a matter beyond the scope of 
this thesis.176 Nevertheless, detection and apprehension of lawbreakers 
continues to be a core element in controlling antisocial behaviour. 
 
The value of enforcement is in its ability to promote order and obedience. Police 
only value-add if their activity significantly changes behaviour. Amongst its other 
aims, Prohibition’s purpose was to reduce drunkenness, crime, and violence - 
essentially Prohibition sought to reduce the base criminogenic potential of the 
population and its consequential stress on the US judicial system. Subsequent 
sections of this thesis explore how effective the legislation was in reducing these 
measurable factors. 
 
Administrative instability marred implementation of the Act. At its inception, an 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury supervised the Prohibition Bureau, the 
Customs Bureau and the Coast Guard. Five persons held that office between 
January 1920 and April 1925. For eight months during that period, the position 
was vacant, with no one explicitly supervising the prohibition forces or 
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coordinating the three services.177 A cornerstone of the Act was the policy of 
concurrent enforcement between the local state police forces and federal officials, 
yet cost administration and responsibilities for enforcing prohibition was often so 
poorly coordinated that local police were confused about their enforcement 
priorities.178 
 
Even in states that had been vigorously enforcing Prohibition before the National 
Prohibition Act there were difficulties in implementing the law. The 1929 
Wickersham Commission stated:  
Virginia has been a zealous prohibition state since 1914. There is not only a stringent 
state law reinforcing the federal law, but also a special state enforcing machinery for 
which considerable appropriations have been made annually. The testimony is uniform 
that the federal administrator has been more than ordinarily efficient and determined. 
The state officers likewise have been under exceptional pressure to do their whole duty. 
They state that the state machinery of enforcement is as efficient as it can be made 
within the practicable limits of expenditure. It works in entire harmony with the federal 
agencies. The number of convictions under the state law is impressive, and of seizures 
thereunder no less so. Yet the number of arrests for drunkenness in Richmond has 
been growing steadily and has increased by more than one-third in five years. Also the 
testimony shows that the amount of liquor in circulation has grown steadily. Prices tell 
the same story. It cannot be said that there is a reasonably effective enforcement in 
Richmond, and the evidence as to Norfolk and Roanoke is to the same effect.179 
 
As may be expected, Prohibition was more effective in smaller communities. The 
Wickersham Commission writes, ‘Enforcement is at its best in the rural 
communities in those states where there was already long established state 
prohibition before the National Prohibition Act.’ The Commission contrasts areas 
where economic opportunity exists in allowing recreational beverages:  
In certain localities where there is a large tourist business enforcement fails because of 
the insistence of business men and property owners that tourists be given a free hand. 
In such places there is not merely no state enforcement and no state cooperation, but 
all attempts at enforcement are substantially precluded by public opinion.180 
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This finding reflects the modern-day commercial experience - where there is 
money to be made in a manner that does not introduce substantial liabilities to 
the businesses involved, then that commercial activity will be pursued with vigour. 
 
The National Prohibition Act’s implementation is a textbook example of a 
legislative response to a societal problem that generates other social problems.181 
Solutions to the problems were one-shots where policymakers discovered failings 
in their implementation strategy, devised further solutions that caused further 
problems, and so on. The Act experienced changes in both the statute and in the 
enforcing organization. In eleven years, Congress amended or added to the 
statute in important particulars four times. The central organization as set up 
originally was radically changed twice. In July 1921, the office of supervising 
federal prohibition agent was abolished, and enforcement placed under the aegis 
of 48 state directors. The occupants of these positions changed constantly - 184 
men were in and out of these 48 positions during the years 1921 to 1925, at which 
time the office was abolished.  
 
Staffing of the Prohibition Bureau did not proceed without flaw. The enforcement 
agents, inspectors and attorneys, as was authorized in section 38 of the National 
Prohibition Act, were appointed without regard to the Civil Service rules.182 These 
appointments were significant as this meant that prohibition agents did not have 
to abide by the civil services stringent rules. Instead, local politicians appointed 
agents, with the consequential opportunities for corruption.183 One Congressman 
declared of these inadequately trained agents that: ‘If prohibition can only be 
enforced by the use of sawed-off shotguns in the hands of irresponsible 
Government agents, then indeed, we have reached the high tide of fanaticism 
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and bigotry in this matter’.184 This issue is further examined in section IV.I: 
Corruption. 
 
The National Prohibition Act imposed a huge change in the way some Americans 
did business. The Act also regulated the production of industrial alcohol and gave 
to the administrative supervisors of that industry the powers of granting, renewing, 
and revoking permits. A system of administrative tribunals was set up to pass on 
what amounted to very important property rights. In the words of the Wickersham 
Commission: ‘The operation of administrative tribunals of all kinds, necessary as 
they obviously are, is giving serious concern, largely because of their lack of 
technique and lack of experience and the inherent difficulty of providing effective 
control’.185 Not only does this administrative system provide opportunities for 
corruption, it also requires the imposition of new structures of control with a steep 
learning curve for those responsible for the oversight of that system. Over the first 
11 years of Prohibition the system of permits in connection with industrial alcohol 
were changed three times.186 The federal government, in its implementation of 
the National Prohibition Act, was required to conceive entirely new structures of 
oversight and control. That there were ‘teething troubles’ in instituting these 
structures is not surprising - federal law enforcement was called upon to involve 
itself in the areas of life previously left unregulated, or entirely the province of the 
states. 
 
The inexperience of those charged with administrative oversight of industrial 
alcohol is evidenced in the example of a Philadelphia cigar maker who, in the 
process of making cigars, had spent $480 on alcohol in the previous eighteen 
years obtained an official permit for 420,000 gallons of alcohol a year. This 
quantity was more than enough to soak all the cigar tobacco leaf in the world, the 
Prohibition Bureau later claimed.187 There were thousands of fly-by-night 
manufacturers of hair-restorers, skin conditioners, and other toilet preparations 
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smelling of whiskey, gin, or rum who suddenly required large amounts of industrial 
alcohol. According to the Wickersham Commission:  
The diversion of industrial alcohol was extensive in the earlier years of prohibition, and 
appears to have reached its maximum at about 1925 and 1926. As other sources of 
domestic supply have been developed this has decreased. Smuggling reached its 
highest point at about 1926. With the development of less costly means of domestic 
supply smuggling has gradually decreased until it is now in large measure confined to 
the more expensive foreign wines and liquors, purveyed to people of means.188 
 
Had the propaganda and education component of hegemony done its job, public 
sentiment would have been sufficiently in favour of Prohibition that enforcement 
would have encountered far less difficulty in achieving its function. Citizen 
surveillance, ‘dobbing in one’s neighbour’, would have been as acceptable to the 
population as modern day narcotics prohibition. Drinking would have been the 
province of losers and social misfits, corresponding to the attitude towards 
‘junkies’ and ‘ice addicts’ in evidence today. 
 
To summarise, the enforcement infrastructure to implement Prohibition was 
inadequate and poorly resourced, the Act did not enjoy nationwide popularity, the 
legislation was difficult to enforce and had a number of exceptions, and the Act’s 
administration lacked competence and consistency. Despite this, the Act was only 
a little more dangerous to enforce than present day narcotics prohibition, putting 
the lie to Hollywood tropes of a Prohibition bloodbath. 
 
A major factor in the effectiveness of legislation is governed by the bureaucracy 
responsible for administering it. The reformers of 1919 made an unrealistic 
assessment of the financial, human capital and technological resources required 
for effective implementation of their program. The political will was lacking to 
allocate credible resources to implement the legislation. Reformers lacked 
understanding of how these allocations would be channeled to achieve their aims 
- resources were uselessly expended both internally and externally as turf wars 
erupted between competing organisations, stifling the coordination and 
cooperation required to implement reform.189 To say that organisational 
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inefficiency marred the implementation of the National Prohibition Act would be 
an understatement. 
 
Why was there such a high level of organisational inefficiency? The Act had as 
one of its clauses a provision for ‘concurrent enforcement’ of Prohibition between 
state and federal. As the states had apparatus to enforce local legislation, it made 
sense that the states should extend their operations to a concurrent enforcement 
of national alcohol prohibition. One factor contributing to Prohibition’s 
organisational inefficiency was the underwhelming cooperation extended by 
many states to federal authorities. The next section examines this difficulty. 
 
 
C State Federal Relations 
G L Cleaver, the Former State Superintendent of Secret Service, and Former State Prohibition 
Commissioner, of Inglewood, California in 1929: ‘In answer to a question about the practicability of 
prohibition, one of our greatest statesmen answered, “We do not know yet, because enforcement has never 
been tried.”’ 190  
 
A stakeholder in any federal legislative initiative is the states. The balance of 
powers doctrine pits the reserved powers of the states against the centralised 
power of the federal government. Under the Constitution of the United States of 
America, matters exclusive of trade, national economics and international 
relations are reserved to the many individual states making up the nation of the 
USA. Matters pertaining to criminal law are considered the province of these 
states. The 18th Amendment altered this arrangement and inserted a nationwide, 
not just interstate, restraint of trade in alcoholic beverages – Prohibition. To many 
in the states this represented a power grab by the Federal government that greatly 
altered the power dynamic, favouring centralised government. This section 
examines that conflict. 
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Control of alcoholic beverages had always been the province of the states. In 
1847, in the License Cases, Chief Justice Taney wrote:  
If any state deems the retail and internal traffic in ardent spirits injurious to its citizens, 
and calculated to produce idleness, vice, or debauchery, I see nothing in the 
constitution of the United States to prevent it from regulating and restraining the traffic, 
or from prohibiting it altogether, if it thinks proper. 
 
Forty years later, in Mugler v. Kansas, the Court reiterated that states had ‘the 
acknowledged right ... to control their purely internal affairs, and, in so doing, to 
protect the health, morals, and safety of their people by regulations that do not 
interfere with the execution of the powers of the general government’.191 
 
The popularity of an outright prohibition of alcohol widely varied between states; 
the Wet vote was 90% greater than the Dry vote in 6 states (Washington, 
Colorado, Kansas, North Dakota, Ohio, and Kentucky), but less than 40% of the 
Dry vote in Maine, Utah, Wyoming and Idaho.192 So whilst the Dry vote was high 
on a nationwide level, at the individual and largely independent state level a 
significant proportion of the states found the idea of national prohibition decidedly 
unpopular. This is evidenced by the degree of inaction of some states in enacting 
and financing their own concurrent enforcement legislation of Prohibition. 
 
Nation, a popular US countrywide magazine, opined in 1919 that if the Eighteenth 
Amendment were overthrown ‘the right of self-government which the Constitution 
guarantees to the people of all the States will continue unimpaired’ but that if the 
Amendment were sustained, ‘that right will perhaps disappear so far as the police 
power is concerned, and the way be opened for a Federal centralization 
practically complete’.193  
 
These fears were in some aspects realised. National Alcohol Prohibition was the 
first federal initiative seeking to control the details of everyday life, yet the federal 
government lacked the institutional structures necessary to independently 
implement the Eighteenth Amendment. Congress was forced to attempt to 
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conscript state law enforcement resources, an act provoking sustained 
controversy about the proper boundary between state and national sovereignty. 
Both supporters and opponents of Prohibition struggled to understand how the 
Eighteenth Amendment's radical enlargement of federal authority could be 
reconciled with the ideals of federalism. Many Americans came to reject the idea 
that the national government ought to be involved in detailed police regulations 
seeking to control the minutiae of everyday life.194 
 
In 1923, Woodrow Wilson asked Justice Brandeis of the High Court to draw up a 
‘statement of principles’ about Prohibition for the Democratic Party.  Brandeis 
interpreted the Eighteenth Amendment's reference to ‘concurrent power’ to signify 
that the American people ‘recognized fully that the law could not be enforced 
without the co-operation of the States with the Nation . . . The intention was that 
each government should perform that part of the task for which it was peculiarly 
fitted.’ Brandeis postulated that: ‘The Federal Government's part is to protect the 
United States against illegal importation of liquor from foreign countries and to 
protect each State from the illegal introduction into it of liquor from another State.’ 
In so saying, Brandeis acknowledges: ‘To perform that part of the task effectively 
requires centralized, unified action and the employment of the large federal 
powers and resources.’ The job of a state, by contrast, was to police ‘the illegal 
sale within it of liquor illegally manufactured in it’ for that is a task for which State 
Governments are peculiarly fitted; and which they should perform. Relieving the 
States from the duty of performing this task, said Brandeis, ‘violates our traditions; 
and threatens the best interests of our country’.195  
 
Federal judge Henry Priest agreed with Brandeis: 
by this Amendment, we have introduced a radical change in the organic structure of 
our federal Government. We have commissioned it to legislate upon the purely local 
and domestic affairs of every community in every state of the Union, and have expressly 
denied to them the power all communities have been accustomed to exercise for more 
than a century and a quarter ... to regulate their conduct according to their own 
conceptions of propriety.196  
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Brandeis's account of federalism turns on principles of institutional design; it 
postulates that national and state governments should each be assigned duties 
commensurate with their institutional competencies. Brandeis interpreted the 
‘concurrent power’ provision of the Eighteenth Amendment to divide state from 
federal authority along lines of instrumental capacity. In accordance with this view, 
the constitutional question was not whether prohibition should be enforced, but 
which level of government could best enforce it.197  
 
Brandeis’s principles and the ghost of National Alcohol Prohibition combine in the 
modern era in the form of national drug prohibition. In 2012, it is estimated that 
there were 1,552,432 arrests for drug abuse violations,198 resulting in about 
98,000 federal incarcerations and 200,000 state incarcerations.199 The US’s 
national drug enforcement body, the Drug Enforcement Authority (DEA), whilst 
viewing itself as primarily working at a national rather than local level,200 is 
nevertheless empowered by the enabling Act to concurrently enforce drug 
prohibition.201 The level of agreement forged between federal and state 
governments over the prosecution of drug prohibition has resulted in concurrent 
enforcement proceeding in a relatively uncontroversial manner. How is it that the 
federal government orchestrated such unprecedented cooperation? 
 
Marijuana and its derivatives, opiates, including laudanum, and coca derivatives 
were freely available before and to a great extent during Prohibition. The first 
signs of regulation appeared with The Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914 
(marijuana was classed as a narcotic) restricting the manufacture and distribution 
of opiates, including laudanum, and coca derivatives in the US. Opiates were still 
available medicinally, though treatment with narcotics to manage addiction was 
made illegal.202 These provisions were strengthened with the Uniform State 
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Narcotic Act of 1932, a federal initiative to encourage state cooperation with a 
national scheme to control narcotics.203 Federal government had learnt from 
Prohibition - the necessity for uniform state enforcement of federal criminal law 
initiatives led to years-long propaganda initiatives encouraging the states to enlist 
their enforcement apparatus in the prosecution of narcotic crimes.204 This was 
ultimately successful as by 1937 every state had enacted some form of legislation 
relating to marijuana, and 35 of the then 47 states had passed the Uniform Act 
pertaining to narcotics.205  
 
In the 1920s such cooperation had not been forged. Maryland Governor Albert C. 
Ritchie advanced the position that 
the Eighteenth Amendment ... does not mean that the States are legally or morally 
obliged to exercise their concurrent power of enforcement. No State is called upon to 
provide enforcement machinery for the Federal income tax law or the narcotic law or 
the Mann act or any other Federal enactment that I know of ... Why, then, should any 
State be obligated to set up State machinery to enforce just one out of all the thousands 
of Federal laws - the Federal prohibition law - merely because the Eighteenth 
Amendment says that it has the power to do so? 206 
 
The state of Maryland never enacted a state enforcement code.207 As one 
observer noted:  
The Marylander is quite willing to yield even respect and obedience to a law he believes 
oppressive, provided it was passed by his own people, but his innate sense of 
independence resents the effort of Kansans to impose a law on him through what he 
believes to be a smug piece of sanctimonious humbuggery.208 
 
This controversy may be partly attributed to the novelty of concurrent 
enforcement. Justice Sutherland, who two years before his appointment to the 
Court was an elected senator, noted that in 1920 nobody ‘in either house of 
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Congress had the slightest idea what was intended by the idea of "concurrent 
power" in Section 2 of the Eighteenth Amendment’.209  
 
In 1923, New York repealed its antiliquor statute, the Mullan-Gage law. In 
discussing his decision not to veto the repeal, Governor Smith essentially   
adopted Maryland Governor Ritchie's position. He asserted that he was ‘entirely 
unwilling to admit the contention that there was put upon the State, either by the 
Eighteenth Amendment [or] the Volstead act ... any obligation to pass any law 
adopting into the State law the provisions of the Volstead act.’ The Eighteenth 
Amendment was ‘not a command but an option. It does not create a duty’. Any 
other conclusion, Smith contended, would be inconsistent with ‘the supremacy of 
the Federal Government in its own sphere and the sovereignty of the several 
States in theirs’, which is ‘one of the great elements in the strength of our 
democracy’.210  
 
Some states exercised their capacity to avoid unpopular federal law. In 1928, 
political scientist Professor Howard McBain described the process by which the 
states seek to circumvent constitutional amendments such as the ‘dignified, 
deliberate, open’ procedure to nullify the 15th that sought to enfranchise Negroes 
through the regular processes of law. Unfortunately, writes McBain ‘the nullifiers 
of the eighteenth amendment cannot proceed in orderly fashion.’ McBain goes on 
to say:  
it is difficult to see how any state law could be enacted that would successfully outwit 
the prohibition amendment and national enforcement act.  The most that any of the 
states have done, or can do at present, is to refuse to have any enforcement law of 
their own - a policy that has been pursued by New York, Maryland, Nevada, and 
Montana.211 
 
In other states alcohol prohibition remained legally in force but only federal 
resources were used to implement the Act. The Wickersham Commission writes:  
Illinois, which had prohibition prior to the Eighteenth Amendment, adopted in 1923 an 
act modeled on the National Prohibition Act intended to establish a uniformity of state 
and federal laws on the subject. But state appropriations for enforcement of prohibition, 
which were made for a time, have ceased, and the survey made by direction of the 
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United States Commissioner of Prohibition in 1930 says frankly that ‘a breakdown of 
state enforcement work is apparent’.212  
 
By 1927, only eighteen of the forty-eight states were appropriating money for the 




The map above shows the evolution during the time of Prohibition of state-based 
statutes banning local alcohol use.214 
 
Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon in his 1926 report described the tension 
between state and federal governments:  
The Treasury felt with respect to local law enforcement that too much responsibility had 
been placed upon the Federal Government. Even in those States which already had 
satisfactory State laws, and in which local machinery for enforcement had been 
provided, citizens and officials were looking to the Federal forces for the performance 
of police duties which were purely local. This misinterpretation of jurisdiction, while 
perhaps natural and for that reason excusable, proved a serious hindrance to the 
successful enforcement of the national prohibition law. Were the Federal Government 
to accept this responsibility, it must organize large police forces in the various 
communities, and, in addition, must provide adequate judicial machinery for the 
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disposition of the local cases - an interference by the Federal Government with local 
government which could not be other than obnoxious to every right-thinking citizen.215 
 
Sen. Bingham agreed:  
… the framers of the original Constitution specifically considered and rejected a general 
federal police power to enact sumptuary legislation ... which would deal with the habits 
of the people, with what they ate, drank, and wore, and recognized that this moral 
regulation was properly a matter for local communities.216 
 
Between 1921 and 1929, Assistant Attorney General Mabel Walker Willebrandt 
led the Justice Department’s attempt to coordinate the prosecution of Prohibition 
crimes. Willebrandt estimated that in New York State there were some 3,000 state 
police, a 17,000-strong city police force, 113 state Supreme Court judges, and 62 
county prosecutors. From the end of 1923 onward, they refused to enforce 
Prohibition laws. This did not mean that in these states Prohibition no longer 
existed. What it did mean is that federal agencies, and the highly corrupt 
Prohibition Bureau, could no longer enlist the aid of these state authorities in their 
fight against bootlegging.217 
 
John Philip Hill, a ‘wet’ representative in Congress from Maryland wrote: ‘I should 
like to see the Eighteenth Amendment repealed, power being retained by the 
Congress to protect the states from outside interference with their local laws ...’218  
 
After repeal in 1933 most questions regarding alcohol devolved to the states. 
Seven continued with prohibition, though five of these declared beer to be non-
intoxicating; twelve states decided to permit liquor, but only for home 
consumption; twenty-nine states allowed liquor by the glass.219 All states 
regulated alcohol consumption to varying degrees. Some states instituted an 
Alcohol Beverage Control Board to oversee these mandates. 
 
The Alcohol Beverage Control (ABC) laws that the states did adopt were designed 
in part to curb the most notorious abuses of the pre-Prohibition era. Restrictions 
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were imposed on hours and days of sales in an effort to diminish the seductive 
pull of the saloon upon the breadwinner that took him away from his domestic 
obligations. Sunday closings were observed; liquor could no longer be sold on 
election days: the ‘tied-house’, where a public house is required to buy at least 
some of its beer from a particular brewery or company, was banned – tied-houses 
were blamed for inciting extreme forms of consumption behavior. Visibility 
requirements were instituted; in some states, they mandated that bars be open to 
public inspection, in others they kept the spectacle of the drinking act safely 
hidden from the eyes of children or decent citizens.220 
 
In return, the state received valuable revenues. A 1940 trade magazine 
underscored the industry's own promotion of these benefits:  
A little child is playing happily in the streets of a big city. With all the strength of a twelve-
year-old, he throws the ball against the side of a building. It bounces off his hand on 
the rebound. Quickly the youth runs after the ball into the middle of the street. Brakes 
screech wildly. One anguished scream rends the air. Johnny lies unconscious beneath 
the wheels of a big truck, his two legs broken. Were it not for alcoholic beverages, 
Johnny might go through life a helpless cripple. Thanks to the revenue derived from 
liquor taxes, however, the state has been able to build and maintain a large hospital 
just for cases like this.221 
 
The power dynamic of federated states appears to favour over time the 
centralisation of power. Under its external affairs power the US government 
actively pursued international treaties restricting trade in narcotics. The federal 
government then used the satisfaction of these treaties as a basis for federal 
legislation controlling the internal trade in and use of narcotics. It is this sort of 
circular use of power that functions to increase the influence of the federal relative 
to the state governments. Some state government officeholders will resist the 
diminution of states’ rights compared to federal power, following the separation of 
powers doctrine. National narcotics prohibition is the exception (though this 
exception is being whittled away by such initiatives as state-based medical 
marijuana laws) to a tradition of state resistance to federal encroachment of their 
reserved powers. It is clear that in any federal government initiative the States are 





highly interested stakeholders that function to determine the success or failure of 
national reform. 
 
Despite the lack of overwhelming public and state support, did Prohibition 
manage to significantly reduce the production and supply of alcohol? This 
question is examined in the next section. 
 
 
D Punishing Production 
 
[P]unishment must be regarded as a retribution that the guilty man makes to each of his fellow citizens, for 
the crime that has wronged them all 222 
 
It is accepted wisdom regarding Prohibition that the enforcement apparatus of 
government was unable to control the production and supply of alcoholic 
beverages. To what degree is this accurate, and if so why? The factors controlling 
the success of Prohibition criminal enterprise is here examined. 
 
Entrepreneurs desiring to take advantage of continued demand for alcohol used 
the 12 months grace period to prepare for Prohibition. Senator Bruce in 1927 is 
quoted as saying: ‘During the first twelve months after it took effect it looked as if 
it might work ... But in an incredibly short period an entire underworld for the 
manufacture, sale and distribution of drink was called into being...’ 223 From this 
statement, and from other reports and statistics from the time of Prohibition it 
appears that there is a grace period of about a year or as much as two during 
which alcohol prohibition had a significant effect upon the population.224 This 
represents the amount of time required to build production (or importation), 
distribution and sales networks. Other substances may have differing prohibition 
grace periods depending upon the difficulty of manufacture and supply.  
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According to the Act homemade ciders, wines and cordials were protected by law 
unless they were offered for sale. It was legal to serve a guest in your home with 
an alcoholic beverage, and soon issues as to what constituted a ‘home’ and how 
to determine who was a ‘guest’ became important. Small bootlegging operations 
prospered, protected by this proviso, complicating the enforcement of the Act. 
Bootleggers were also able to redistil denatured alcohol (grain alcohol to which 
substances had been added to make it unfit for consumption), removing these 
substances by boiling and condensing and then colouring and flavouring the 
beverage to disguise its origin.  
 
Twenty months after Prohibition became effective, the Internal Revenue Bureau, 
later the Prohibition Bureau, reckoned that bootlegging had become a one billion 
dollar business, and a senior official urged the government to take steps to 
recover $32 million from bootleggers in excess profits taxes. The Bureau claimed 
that Americans consumed 25 million gallons of illegal liquor in 1920 and noted 
that the new Prohibition Unit had released another 30 million gallons to 
consumers for medicinal purposes.225 Unfortunately for government revenues, 
taxing income that was not supposed to exist was a politically unpopular move - 
except perhaps in the much-publicised case of Al Capone.226 
 
Californian entrepreneur and winemaker Bertha Beringer had the foresight to see 
Prohibition coming well in advance and switched production from making wine to 
making ‘raisin cakes’. These cakes converted into wine after being submerged in 
water for 21 days. Presentations were held to sell the cakes at which customers 
were urged not to ‘accidently’ carry out the process. The label bore the warning 
(or advertisement) ‘Caution; Will ferment and turn into wine’. Due to these 
entrepreneurial activities, before long Californian grape production was up 
tenfold.227  
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Alcohol is produced from corn and cane sugars inexpensively and with ease. 
Unlike the ‘sour mash’ method the addition of yeast allows this process to take 
place with little odour or residue, thus simplifying concealment of moonshiner and 
household distiller operations from the surveillance of the law, and making it 
difficult for the officers of the law to locate and suppress such illicit manufacture 
of liquor.228 The availability of precursor materials is a fundamental factor in the 
efficacy by which the production of an illegal end-product survives the scrutiny of 
enforcement officials. 
 
The difficulty in suppressing the manufacture of alcohol is similar to the present 
day suppression of ‘meth lab’ activity in the production of a form of 
methamphetamine known as ‘ice’.229 Small-scale ice production facilities are able 
to generate huge profits in a manner generally free from surveillance.230 A 
difference is that the precursor chemical for alcohol generation is sugar, a freely 
available substance whilst ice requires a restricted substance found in cold and 
flu medications - pseudoephedrine or phenylephrine.231   Alcohol distillers during 
Prohibition also faced a difficulty in that the measure of their output was of a 
different order of magnitude - litres (or pints) rather than the grams by which 
methamphetamine labs measure their production. The volume of an item is a 
significant factor in the ability to escape surveillance during production and 
distribution as was discussed in section II.B: Economic Theory. 
 
The Wickersham Commission made a succinct summary of the situation that 
developed during Prohibition:  
The improved methods, the perfection of organization, the case of production, the 
cheapness and easy accessibility of materials, the abundance of localities where such 
plants can be operated with a minimum risk of discovery, the ease with which they may 
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be concealed, and the huge profits involved have enabled this business to become 
established - to an extent which makes it very difficult to put to an end.232 
 
The techniques and technologies of surveillance that exist today were not 
available to the burgeoning Prohibition Bureau of the 1920s. 
 
An additional difficulty was that the Volstead Act reinforced the federal statute 
relating to search and seizure. The Act added a clause making issuance of any 
warrant dependent on proof that the liquor was for sale. No matter how much 
liquor a person had at home, no matter how it was obtained or what use was 
intended, agents had to have positive evidence that a commercial transaction was 
involved. Such a requirement functioned to permit home manufacture, both for 
personal use and as a cottage industry organised as part of large criminal 
networks. Small stills were set up by bootleggers in apartments much as meth 
labs operate today.233 
 
Clearly criminal entrepreneurs benefited from Prohibition. A submission to the 
Sub-Committee of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, April, 1926, made by the 
Joint Legislative Committee for Modification of the Volstead Act, quoted District 
Attorney Buckner of New York as estimating the money value of the alcoholic 
liquor fabricated from redistilled denatured alcohol in the states of New York and 
Pennsylvania alone to be more than $3,600,000,000 a year. Federal Prohibition 
Administrator  Frederick C. Baird, of the Pittsburgh district, estimates the value of 
the moonshine products of  the stills he had captured in his district, in an eight-
month period, to be in excess of $2,000,000,000  a year. The overall estimate of 
the value of the unlawful output of alcoholic liquor in these territories alone, not 
including any smuggled liquors, was approximately $5,600,000,000 a year, ‘about 
four times the value of all alcoholic liquors consumed in the United States before 
prohibition’.234 Whilst DA Buckner’s figures should not be taken at face value, it 
would appear that criminal enterprise took full advantage of the demand for 
alcohol and its elevated price to make large profits from the business of selling 
liquor. 
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The ease with which alcohol was manufactured is evidenced by the 172,000 stills 
or parts of stills captured in 1925. According to further evidence presented by the 
Joint Legislative Committee for Modification of the Volstead Act  
the number captured year after year has increased rather than diminished, and that the 
federal administrator of prohibition admitted that not one still in ten in actual operation 
is captured by the agents of the Government. The stills and parts of stills were captured 
in vastly greater numbers in so-called ‘dry’ states than in ‘wet’ states, proving 
conclusively that where it is more difficult to obtain smuggled or diverted whisky the 
demand is supplied by local manufacture.235 
 
The increase in domestic supply was so great that by the late 1920's that the price 
of hard liquor in northern California fell below the point at which it was profitable 
to run beverages in from Canada by ship.236 This led Major Chester P. Mills, 
Former Prohibition Administrator, Metropolitan District, New York to state in 1929: 
‘Statistics show that under 2 percent of the liquor consumed is imported.’237 Cities 
were awash with alcohol wrote newspaperman Malcolm Bingay: ‘It was absolutely 
impossible to get a drink in Detroit unless you walked at least ten feet and told the 
busy bartender what you wanted in a voice loud enough for him to hear you above 
the uproar’.238 
 
Licit supplies of a substance, such as medicinal and sacramental alcohol, were 
also sourced to illicit ends. Prohibition allowed any church to apply for 
Sacramental wine. It was not long before many people successfully applied to the 
government for licences, claiming that their houses happened to be a church with 
a congregation of thousands. Many genuine religious establishments also took 
advantage of Prohibition to supply the more secular needs of their flock.239  
 
Thornton tells us that:  
Prohibition also led many people to drink more ‘legitimate’ alcohol, such as patent 
medicines (which contained high concentrations of alcohol), medicinal alcohol, and 
sacramental alcohol. The amount of alcoholic liquors sold by physicians and hospitals 
doubled between 1923 and 1931. 240 
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This statement misrepresents the significance of these sources of beverage 
alcohol. 
 
Local illicit manufacture of alcohol was by far the most significant source of 
bootleg beverages. In 1926 Anheuser-Busch was selling more than six million 
pounds of malt syrup annually to ‘home brewers’, a level the company would 
maintain until Prohibition’s end despite the explosive growth of large-scale, 
organised brewery operations in some cities in the mid- to late twenties. ‘If you 
really want to know’ Gussie Busch told an interviewer decades later, ‘we ended 
up as the biggest bootlegging supply house in the United States’.241 
 
Alcohol has been produced for millennia through easily sourced local ingredients. 
Its appeal is transnational and pervasive. The equipment required for production 
is licit and easily available. The techniques to produce fermented beverages and 
their distillates are well known. Into this environment was thrust a fledgling 
regulatory regime that was ill-prepared and under-resourced in its efforts to 
command the respect of potential bootleggers. That this enforcement apparatus 
was able to interdict, undermine and restrict production and supply of alcohol in 
any substantial manner for as long as it did is perhaps surprising. The degree to 
which the nature of enforcement itself changed in its efforts to interdict alcohol 





Law, then, acts as an interface through which governmental decisions can take effect by adjusting the 
operations and arrangements of the disciplinary mechanisms.242 
 
How can policing act to command the respect of potential lawbreakers? Policing 
is at its most effective when it functions as a deterrent - once police have to 
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intervene in a situation, this constitutes a failure of hegemonic control. Perhaps 
the most effective policing is found in the concept of ‘community policing’. William 
Blackstone theorised that police should build upon ‘the rules of propriety, good 
neighbourhood, and good manners’. Sir Robert Peel told his men that the ‘ability 
of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police 
actions’.243 Today, studies show that police officers feel more of a sense of 
isolation from the public. They see themselves not as agents of or equals to other 
citizens, but as a group with authority over the general population. This transition 
is thought to have occurred during the Prohibition era when policing became 
highly paramilitary.244 The question as to which style of policing is more effective, 
community or paramilitary, was discussed by writers during Prohibition. This 
section makes brief mention of this controversy. 
 
In the essay ‘Unusual and Tyrannical Methods Ineffective’ (author unknown) 
reprinted by antiprohibitionist Joseph Debar the limits of policing is explored 
through the example of Vermont, a state adopting Prohibition in 1852. The 
uncertain popularity of this law was exemplified when in 1853 a recommendation 
that the law be repealed was voted down by 91 to 90. As public sentiment was 
inadequately in favour of Prohibition this led to enforcement difficulties. In 
response, the Vermont legislature alienated certain citizens’ rights in favour of 
greater police power. The police were authorised to conduct warrantless 
searches, penalties were made more severe, and the chancery courts could 
declare a suspected liquor sellers’ place of business a ‘nuisance’ without jury trial. 
 
Under what was called ‘The Disclosure’ every man arrested for intoxication must 
disclose to the satisfaction of the judge the place where and the person from 
whom he secured liquor, and if he did not so disclose he could be committed to 
jail - violating the principle that no man shall be bound to give evidence against 
himself. In modern times, this principle has been rendered moot through the 
process of plea-bargaining, a matter discussed in section IV.K: The Judicial 
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System. Under ‘The Disclosure’  any man found drunk, or simulating 
drunkenness, could declare that he obtained his drink from anyone with whom he 
might be at enmity, and his word was by law a proof superior to any denials or 
testimony by friends that the accused might offer. The unknown author declared 
that over 50 years the statutes regarding Prohibition became as voluminous as 
those applying to all other crimes and misdemeanours, yet difficulties in 
compliance remained.245 
 
The Volstead Act contained provisions for nuisance (s21) and conferred the 
burden of proof regarding possession of alcoholic beverages upon the possessor 
(s33). The Act never went so far in its provisions as that enacted by the State of 
Vermont, although the methods employed by Prohibition enforcement officers set 
the stage for a shift from community policing to the more paramilitary style 
commonly practised in the US today. The adversarial nature of Prohibition 
enforcement, with increasingly organised and well-resourced criminal networks 
facing off against government agents, may have been a turning point for police.  
 
A lesson from Prohibition is that paramilitary policing is required where 
enforcement is difficult, and ‘tyrannical’ methods are all that remain of the tools 
that police can employ to enforce the law. This indicates a failure in the 
propaganda element of hegemony where the population is insufficiently 
supportive of a governmental policy. Police are part of this propaganda effort as 
proponents of the idea that ‘the best friend you have is the law’, employing such 
means as community engagement and the present-day plethora of television 
programs promoting the idea that enforcement officials are the friendly yet firm 
proponents of peace in the war against deviance. 
 
Community policing may thus be considered more ‘democratic’, whilst 
paramilitary policing more tyrannical. The shift towards a more paramilitary style 
of law enforcement indicates a movement in the balance of power between 
democracy and despotism. Prohibition significantly increased the power of the 
state, and whilst Prohibition was repealed much of the machinery of power 
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instituted during this period remains - as is indicated by the style of present-day 
US police power. 1920s Prohibition failed to win the overwhelming popularity 
required to enforce a law through community policing, and left enforcement 
agencies with little recourse but to respond with ever greater levels of force in its 




F Alcohol consumption 
 
A Prohibition trope is that drinking alcohol became, if anything, more common 
during Prohibition - part of the culture of the ‘Roaring 20s’. With what effectiveness 
was Prohibition police power employed to curtail the consumption of alcohol? This 
section explores the manner in which Prohibition changed alcohol consumption, 
and for whom. Drinking is examined using statistics available on grain and sugar 
sales, rates of alcohol psychosis and cirrhosis of the liver, arrests for drunkenness 
and anecdotal reports. These statistics are examined in the context of the time, a 
perspective that provides a more nuanced viewpoint than that put forward by 
scholars in the ‘alcohol prohibition was a failure’ tradition. 
 
The main evidence of alcohol consumption comes from a 1932 study by Clark 
Warburton, “The Economic Results of Prohibition”.246 No figures are available on 
sales of liquor during Prohibition and the graph below is considered a reasonable 
estimate. 
 
                                            





Per Capita Consumption of Alcoholic Beverages (Gallons of Pure Alcohol) 
1910-1929. 
 
It is a mistake to assume that alcohol consumption was decreasing ‘naturally’ 
before Prohibition. The above graph appears to show a reduction in alcohol 
consumption in the years before 1919. The reason for this reduction is that the 
First World War from 1914 to 1918 was actively prosecuted in Europe. During this 
time, the USA and its people were encouraged to ‘stand by the Allies’. This 
support was evidenced by such measures as grain sales to England. Refraining 
from consuming intoxicating beverages during this time was considered patriotic, 
thus making grain available for export that would otherwise be converted into beer 
and spirits. As a result, alcohol use decreased. 
 
Congress passed various measures to reduce national alcohol consumption 
during the First World War. This culminated in August 1917 with the Lever Food 
and Fuel Control Act banning production of distilled spirits for the duration of the 
war and the War Prohibition Act of November 1918 forbidding the manufacture 
and sale of intoxicating beverages (more than 2.75% alcohol content) until the 
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end of demobilisation.247 The decline in alcohol consumption between 1910 and 
1919 is mainly attributed to these legislative initiatives. 
 
To what degree the depression of alcohol consumption before Prohibition was 
also a result of increased taxation is debatable: ‘taxes rose from $0.50 per proof 
gallon to $1.10 in 1894, where the rate remained until just prior to Prohibition 
when it rose first to $3.20 (then $6.40) for beverage and $2.20 for non-beverage 
spirits’.248 The American Statistical Association writes that for each increase in 
tax, ‘consumers  would  have  for a  time  at  least  reduced  their  use  of spirits,  
but  the  past  leads  us  to  think  that  these  results  would  have been  only  
ephemeral  and  that  in a few years  the receipts  into  the treasury  would  have  
indicated  the  restoration  of normal  conditions’.249 With the above in mind, it is 
more accurate to take the 1910 alcohol consumption figure as the baseline from 
which any drop in consumption should be measured. 
 
Warburton's conjectural synthesis of figures was admittedly rough but they were 
refined in 1948 by E M Jellinek. Even more recently, Joseph Gusfield re-examined 
both these studies and concluded that:  
Prohibition was effective in sharply reducing the rate of alcohol consumption in the 
United States. We may set the outer limit of that at about 50 percent and the inner limit 
at about one-third less alcohol consumed by the total population than had been the 
case ... [before Prohibition] in the United States.250 
 
One method used to assess the degree of heavy alcohol consumption is by 
determining the level of alcohol psychosis. In 1922 James V. May, one of the most 
eminent American psychiatrists, reviewed recent hospital admission rates for 
alcoholic psychoses and wrote: 
With the advent of prohibition the alcoholic psychoses as far as this country is 
concerned have become a matter of little more than historical interest. The admission 
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rate in the New York state hospitals for 1920 was only 1.9 percent [as compared with 
ten percent in 1909-1912].251 
 
Clearly wartime alcohol prohibition was successful in reducing alcohol 
consumption. Admissions to state mental hospitals for disease classified as 
alcoholic psychosis fell from a wartime low of 10.1 per 100,000 in 1919, to 3.7 in 
1922, rising to 4.7 by 1928. 252 
 
A more accurate assessment of alcohol consumption may come from economists 
Miron and Zwiebel. In 1991 they established that ‘alcohol consumption fell sharply 
at the beginning of Prohibition, to approximately 30 percent of its pre-Prohibition 
level’ and by the time of Repeal had risen ‘to about 60–70 percent of its pre-
Prohibition level’.253 Geoffrey Miron went on to conduct a 1999 study using 
cirrhosis of the liver as his sole metric, and revised his findings. Taking the entire 
period of prohibition as a block of time, Miron says: 
Prohibition exerted a minimal effect on the per capita consumption of alcohol. Indeed, 
many specifications, including some of those most defensible on a priori grounds, show 
positive effects of Prohibition on cirrhosis and, by implication, alcohol consumption. 
Even the most extreme of the estimates that allows for addiction and rationality implies 
that Prohibition caused less than a 15 percent decline in cirrhosis relative to its non-
Prohibition value.254 
 
Whilst cirrhosis of the liver is associated with heavy drinking, Miron’s analysis 
attempts to compensate for this and address levels of more moderate 
consumption. 
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Cirrhosis Death Rate, 1900 - 1993 Deaths per 100,000 Population
 
INSET (shaded area): Per capita alcohol consumption for the years 1935 to 1999, 
illustrating the link between alcohol consumption and cirrhosis mortality.255 
 
There is no precise correlation between the global rate of alcohol consumption 
and cirrhosis of the liver. For instance, the peak of alcohol consumption in 1982 
does not correspond to the peak of the cirrhosis death rate that occurred in 1976, 
whereas a previous peak of consumption in 1945 led to deaths in 1949. A study 
by Gary Jensen in 2000 considers that cirrhosis was underreported in the years 
leading up to Prohibition and over reported during the Prohibition years, thus 
skewing calculations based upon this metric.256  
 
Whether we accept Miron’s analysis or prefer to accept psychosis or grain and 
sugar sales as the metric to estimate alcohol consumption, what all the studies 
agree upon is that consumption fell sharply at the beginning of Prohibition, then 
gradually rose as increasingly sophisticated production and supply networks 
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came online. If Miron is correct in his conjecture that consumption rose to exceed 
pre-Prohibition levels, perhaps the psychological effect of illegality itself is 
significant. Morris Markey explained in The New Yorker, writing just two weeks 
after Repeal:  
I went over to the Ambassador Hotel one afternoon for cocktails. We were four men, all 
told. We sat there for three hours, and drank three cocktails each - one an hour. And 
all of us remarked how impossible such temperance would be in any speakeasy we 
have ever known. In the speakeasies there was always a tension, a pressure to drink 
and keep on drinking, even after appetite had faded completely.257 
 
These men in their speakeasies reinforce the classist nature of Prohibition 
legislation. Observers are unanimous in concluding that the greatest decreases 
in consumption occurred in the working class.  Warburton, in comparing alcohol 
consumption in the period of 1911 to 1914 with that during the prohibition years 
1927-1930 concluded: ‘the per capita consumption of beer has been reduced 
about 70 per cent ... the per capita consumption of wine has increased about 65 
per cent, ... [and] the per capita consumption of spirits has increased about 10 
per cent’.258 From 1890 to 1915, beer consumption exceeded that of spirits. Spirits 
consumption fell after repeal while beer consumption rose. By 1935 the alcohol 
consumed from beer again equalled that from spirits, and by 1945 Americans 
were getting 50 percent more of their total alcohol from beer than from ‘hard 
liquor’.259 
 
Beer was overwhelmingly the drink of the working man and Prohibition may have 
priced the poor out of the alcohol market. One estimate of prices in 1928, when 
the average family earned $50 a week, is that a pint of beer cost 40 cents, 6 times 
more expensive than 12 years earlier; gin was $5.90 a quart, 5 times more 
expensive; and whiskey was $7.00, 4 times more expensive.260 This increase was 
not due to inflation - price inflation over the decade of the 1920s was 
approximately zero.261 Miron sagely advises that the available data does not allow 
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computation of the average price actually paid, and that it is possible that prices 
failed to rise substantially.262 
 
Martha Bensley Bruere in 1927 wrote ‘Does Prohibition Work? A Study of the 
Operation of the Eighteenth Amendment Made by the National Federation of 
Settlements, Assisted by Social Workers in Different Parts of the United States’. 
Bruere surveyed social workers across the country and the overwhelming 
impression, even taking account of urban immigrant areas where prohibition laws 
were flouted, was that working people drank very much less than before and that 
prohibition had substantially improved conditions among low-income Americans. 
Workers had shared in the prosperity of the 1920's and moved up the social scale, 
although the common belief of the time is that the money that formerly went to 
support the saloon now was used to pay for the workers' new automobiles and 
radios.263 Reports of welfare agencies from around the country overwhelmingly 
indicated a dramatic decrease among their clients of alcohol-related family 
problems during Prohibition.264 
 
A statement by William S. Kenyon to the Wickersham Commission supports this 
view:  
The old liquor laws aimed to control the public nuisance feature of drinking and failed. 
The present law, in our mining towns at least has largely corrected that failure. There 
is some moonshine liquor, some home-brew, and some bootleg, but the old days of the 
pay-day whoopee are gone. What drinking there is, is under cover, the practice of 
drinking up a whole month's pay, and challenging the world to mortal combat has 
passed. A drunken miner in public is so rare a sight that when it happens one would 
think a dancing bear had come to town, and even his chance acquaintances rally to get 
him out of sight.265 
 
Cornelia James Cannon, a prolific essayist on progressive causes, in an article 
titled ‘Prohibition and the Younger Generation’ wrote:  
The flaunting defiance of the law against alcohol in our large cities cannot be 
dissociated from the defiance of all other law in those crowded, inchoate centers, and 
should not blind us to the decencies and conformities in our smaller communities where 
                                            
262 Miron, above n 254. 
263 Burnham, above n 35. 
264 Aaron and Musto, above n 100. 




the Eighteenth Amendment brings additional strength to an enforcing public opinion 
...266 
 
This statement is consistent with a perception that alcohol consumption was lower 
in the less urbanised areas of the USA. 
 
Whiting Williams, a vice-president of a Cleveland steel company had for many 
years gone in disguise among the working people of several areas in connection 
with handling labor problems. In testifying before the Wickersham Commission 
Williams said: 
most of the people who are writing and talking most actively about the prohibition 
problem are people who, in the nature of things, have never had any contact with the 
liquor problem in its earlier pre-prohibition form and who are, therefore, unduly 
impressed with the changes with respect to drinking that they see on their own level; 
their own level, however, representing an extremely small proportion of the population.  
The great mass who, I think, are enormously more involved in the whole problem, of 
course, in the nature of things are not articulate and are not writing in the 
newspapers.267 
 
The reportage of the times self-selected itself to the upper classes. The types of 
people likely to consort with the writers of the day were not of the lower classes 
and reporters almost never knew about the previous drinking habits of the 
masses. Journalists and other observers reported honestly that they saw 
‘everyone’ drinking. 
 
A measure commonly used to assess the level of alcohol consumption is 
drunkenness. The Rev. Floyd W Tomkins, D.D., LL.D. of Philadelphia presents 
some figures in support of Prohibition and concludes: ‘Comparing the last “wet” 
year with I921, we find a decrease of approximately 50 per cent in the arrests for 
drunkenness.’268 This, in an environment of increased police vigilance and 
decreased tolerance of drunkenness, is quite an achievement. In a 1927 
publication one chief of police said: ‘Before prohibition we hardly arrested 
anybody who was drunk.  Now we bring in even those who smell of liquor.’269 
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The astonishing drop in arrests for drunkenness, illustrated so graphically above, 
was not to last. The Moderation League in 1928 reported: ‘Since then there has 
been an increase every year, so that by 1926 there were more arrests for 
drunkenness than in any year except the 1916 war boom peak.’271 The report went 
on to say: ‘Arrests  for  drunkenness  in 1914 in the 403 places [measured in the 
statistics] were 531,574, reached the war boom peak of 563,792  in  1916, 
dropped to 237,101 in 1920 and rose in  1926 to 559,074. Substantially the same 
rise occurred in the 534 places - increasing from 281,561 in 1920 to 664,101 in 
1926’.272 
 
The statistics recorded for arrests relating to Prohibition are skewed by the metric 
driving the activities of enforcement officers. In Washington State, the district 
officers vigorously enforced the liquor ban through many arrests. By one internal 
account, the agents in Washington made over 7,000 arrests before 1927.273 In an 
effort to achieve impressive statistics - numbers of arrests made, for instance - 
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the Prohibition Bureau might spend its energy pursuing two hundred people with 
a pint each rather than chasing down a single big-time mobster who was selling 





In April 1926, the Joint Legislative Committee for Modification of the Volstead Act 
was convened. Evidence presented before a Sub-Committee of this U.S. Senate 
Judiciary Committee concurred with the above findings:  
Authenticated statistics ... reveal a progressive and continuous increase in arrests for 
drunkenness from 1920, the first year of constitutional prohibition, to 1925 inclusive. 
Arrests for drunkenness began to decline in practically all cities of the United States in 
1917 and continued to drop rapidly during 1918 and 1919, and during the period of this 
decline in arrests for public intoxication, milder beverages, such as beer and wine, were 
the principal drinks readily available for public consumption. By 1924 the arrests for 
drunkenness in the principal cities of the United States were practically as great in 
number as in 1916 and 1917, when they reached the high peak, and available reports 
show that in 1925 they had gone higher than the preprohibition peak.276 
 
Even allowing for greater vigilance on the part of the arresting officers it appears 
that in the urban centres drunkenness fell at the beginning of Prohibition and then 
rose to at least match pre-Prohibition levels. 
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Since all beverage alcohol supply was now illegal, both the formal and informal 
controls of consumption were relaxed. Aspects of drinking that had been 
regulated, such as the hours where consumption and supply can take place, the 
age of consumers and the socially acceptable level of drunkenness were now 
unstructured. In a submission to the 1926 Senate Hearings, Rev. Francis 
Kasaczun is recorded as saying:  
Never in my occupation as a Catholic clergyman have I found children drinking hard 
liquors. I have never found the youth, anywhere from fourteen years old to eighteen or 
nineteen that drank hard liquors. And now you see children drink. You see them drunk.  
I have seen them drunk myself. There were a few children found drunk in the schools 
of the towns, public schools, and had bottles of it in their pockets. Last year there was 
a girl in the town arrested drunk. About two weeks ago there was a boy in another small 
suburban town that was caught on the street drunk. The school-teachers have been 
complaining about children coming to school under the influence of liquor. Before 
[Prohibition] the men drank. Now the women are drinking and the children are 
drinking.277 
 
The difficulty of alcohol prohibition enforcement is evidenced in the state of 
Kansas that had state prohibition since 1880, the first state to write a prohibition 
on alcohol into its constitution. The preponderant sentiment in that state was for 
strict enforcement of the law and the state statute was more restrictive than the 
National Prohibition Act. In March 1930 a prohibition survey of Kansas was made 
by direction of the United States Commissioner of Prohibition. A map contained 
in that survey set forth the situation county by county, marking enforcement as 
‘bad’ or at most ‘fair’ in the counties containing the chief cities of the state, as ‘bad’ 
in the mining regions and as ‘fairly normal’ in the remainder of the state. It marked 
enforcement in the chief city of the state as ‘fair’ because there was no evidence 
of ‘big open saloons’; but admitted that there is ‘considerable evidence of liquor 
traffic’ and that ‘bootlegging is persistent’.278 Not even the most trenchantly 
temperate state in the USA could keep many of its citizens from imbibing whilst 
the rest of the nation was awash with alcohol. 
 
Prohibition did not end alcohol use.  A narrow political movement relying on a 
relatively weak set of statutes succeeded in reducing by perhaps one-third the 
consumption of a drug that had wide historical and popular sanction. 
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Unfortunately, as the above studies indicate, it is impossible to estimate with any 
accuracy the level of alcohol consumption during Prohibition.  
 
From the statistics and reports available, there appears a classist element in 
Prohibition era alcohol consumption. The reduction in alcohol use was most 
prominent amongst the poor. Perhaps this was the intention of the reformers who 
initiated National Prohibition, and such evidence as is available indicates that the 
poorest people experienced an improvement in their lives up to the Great 
Depression of 1929. It is difficult to determine how much of this was due to the 
economic boom of the 1920s with its associated increase in living standards, and 
what was due to diminished ‘escape spending’ on alcohol and an improved family 
life.  
 
Was the reduction in alcohol consumption maintained after Repeal? It was 10 
years before alcohol consumption approached pre-Prohibition levels. Why did it 
take so long for Americans to resume full throated drinking? One answer can be 
found in statistics - consumption only measured taxable alcohol, and it seems a 
reasonable assumption that illicit alcohol production did not cease following 
Repeal. Another answer is in economic austerity - in the words of Robert Higgs: 
‘What we can say with confidence is that as of 1940, the economy had not yet 
recovered fully from the Great Depression’.279 People simply did not have the  
money to spend on luxury items. There was no long-term ‘culture change’ in the 
consumption of alcoholic beverages. 
 
                                            






The reform, in its impact upon drunkenness, may overall be considered a partial 
success. The demographic of those who drank shifted away from the poor 
towards those more well off; from rural to urban; and to an extent to minors. 
Drinking became more underhand, perhaps more frantic with an aura of anxious 
underworld activity and stolen moments. Consumption at first greatly decreased, 
and then slowly increased until by the end of the 1920s levels of drinking 
approached pre-Prohibition levels. Bootleg alcohol was at first expensive, but 
prices dropped as sources of supply increased and distribution networks were put 
in place. The cost of bootleg decreased until alcohol was only slightly more 
expensive than before Prohibition. 
 
From alcohol to narcotics 
This small subsection briefly alludes to the hypothesis that drug and alcohol 
addiction are interchangeable. It is commonly asserted that the people who enjoy 
the mind altering effect of drugs such as alcohol will turn to other psychoactive 
                                            




medications should the source of supply of their habitual drug diminish281 - the 
Gateway hypothesis.282 Thornton quotes physician F. E. Oliver who reported in 
1872 on several studies that showed that consumption of opiates and other 
narcotics increased dramatically when the price of alcohol rose or when 
prohibitions were enforced.283 Oliver claimed that the use of narcotics was also 
common among the membership of total abstinence societies.284 
 
Allen L Benson in 1926 reprinted the report of a committee appointed by the 
Foreign Policy Association during Prohibition to investigate this matter. The report 
is quoted as saying:  
During the last few years, frequent statements have appeared in newspapers and 
periodicals to the effect that prohibition of alcohol in the United States has led to an 
alarming increase in drug addiction. With a view to checking the accuracy of these 
reports, we communicated with the heads of all government bureaus in touch with 
narcotic supervision, police directors in representative cities, prominent physicians 
experienced in the treatment of drug addiction, and prison physicians. Without 
exception, the replies received state that prohibition has had no effect whatever on drug 
addiction in the United States.285 
 
If Benson’s account is to be believed, Prohibition did not result in a transfer of 
consumption from alcohol to other drugs. The alcohol Gateway hypothesis has 
been increasingly controversial since its popular introduction in 1975.286 Indeed, 
it is discredited.287 Prohibition enforcement, from what evidence is available, 
resulted in neither more nor less consumption of narcotics, and the concern over 
diversionary drug use appears more an ideological construct than a reflection of 
reality.  
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Actually no statistics from this period dealing with crime are of any value whatsoever in generalizing about 
crime rates.288 
 
This section examines the effect of Prohibition upon crime. What evidence is 
available suggests that there was no ‘crime wave’. Organised crime and street 
gangs existed before Prohibition as they do in modern times. There was no 
evidence of a rising general disrespect for the law. Again, the evidence suggests 
that the rising crime rate in the 1920s was more perception than reality, more 
ideological than actual. 
 
Thorsten Sellin’s 1931 work on crime rates (cited above in 1968 by Burnham) 
strongly suggests that statistical documentation of crime during Prohibition is 
unreliable.289 In 1933, two criminologists Edwin H. Sutherland and C. H. Gehlke 
reviewed these admittedly inadequate statistics, and concluded that: ‘there is no 
evidence here of a “crime wave”, but only of a slowly rising level.’290 This rise does 
not reflect an increase in the criminogenic potential of the population, a matter 
discussed in section IV.J: Prisons. 
 
Those who seek to confirm ideological positions often cite Prohibition crime rates. 
In 2012, Bowers and Robinson wrote, ‘Once the criminal justice system lost its 
moral credibility with a public that routinely drank alcohol, it lost it normative force 
with them in areas other than alcohol consumption. Crime rates rose generally’.291 
Bowers and Robinson sought to equate rising crime rates with a decrease in 
appreciation for the force of law. As one substantiation for this theory they cite the 
work of libertarian scholar Mark Thornton and an anti-prohibition campaigner of 
the 1920s Charles Hanson Towne, the latter providing cherry picked statistics 
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from the period. Yet despite the impression generated by excited news reports 
during Prohibition, there was no crime wave. 
 
George Gordon Battle, a New York attorney active in the New York Democratic 
Party, takes a position on Prohibition crime from a less ideological perspective. In 
his 1925 essay, ‘The Effect of Prohibition upon Crime’ Battle writes: 
I believe that the Prohibition laws are regarded as in a class by themselves. Very few 
of our people feel any obligation to observe these laws. But I do not observe that this 
habitual violation of the Prohibition statutes carries with it any general contempt of law. 
I believe that the great majority of men and women pay no attention to these statutes, 
but are as obedient as formerly to other laws.292 
  
There was no crime wave. 
 
In a manner consistent with numerous other studies, poverty and social stability 
appear to be the main determining factors in crime. When Dull and Giacopassi in 
1986 analyzed liquor laws and density of alcohol outlets in Tennessee counties, 
they found that a negative relationship existed between alcohol availability and a 
variety of deleterious behaviors and conditions, including suicide and homicide. 
When they analyzed density of alcohol outlets and Uniform Crime Reporting 
statistics in 37 Tennessee cities, significant zero-order correlations between outlet 
density and crime were found, but when the effects of other variables were held 
constant, through regression analyses, alcohol outlets were found to be of 
secondary importance, with poverty and the percentage of minority population in 
each city being the best predictors of crime.293 The more serious alcohol-related 
crimes increased according to the greater proportion of persons living in 
comparative poverty as well as for those who were identifiably ethnic.  
 
In the idealistic words of Clarence Darrow, delivering a speech in 1909:  
You can cure crime in one way, and only one. Abolish monopoly! Give men an 
opportunity to live! Let no man beg for a job! Destroy poverty! Give men light and air 
and food, and the jails will vanish and be a nightmare of the past! (Prolonged 
applause).294 
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Methods to destroy poverty are the subject of much ideological controversy and 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Suffice to say that if poverty is tied to inequity 
then its destruction will not occur in the near future. 
 
One assertion is that Prohibition saw the inception of street gangs. Thornton 
writes,  
In the process of providing goods and services, those criminal organizations resort to 
real crimes in defense of sales territories, brand names, and labor contracts. That is 
true of extensive crime syndicates (the Mafia) as well as street gangs, a criminal 
element that first surfaced during Prohibition.295 
 
Evidence indicates that street gangs ‘surfaced’ well before Prohibition. Street 
gangs were not a new occurrence - they were an urban phenomenon of mainly 
immigrant children who grew up ostracised from mainstream American society. 
These gangs were known to be active around the turn of the century - before the 
advent of Prohibition.296 
 
Stergios Skaperdas of the Department of Economics, University of California has 
this to say about extensive crime syndicates: ‘The American Mafia, or Cosa 
Nostra, traces its origin to the Sicilian Mafia. It expanded rapidly during the time 
of alcohol Prohibition (1920-33).’ 297 It was not only the mafia that expanded their 
businesses during Prohibition. Al Capone expanded his commerce from gambling 
and prostitution to bootlegging during the 1920s.298  
 
Organised crime and street gangs did not surface during Prohibition. Apparently, 
what happened was that in the 1920's the long existent ‘underworld’ became 
publicised and romanticised. The gang crime wave, in other words, was the 
invention of enterprising journalists feeding on some sensational crimes and 
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situations and catering to a public to whom the newly discovered ‘racketeer’ was 
a covert folk hero.299 
 
In summary, evidence available indicates that there was no ‘crime wave’. 
Prohibition violation did not induce a disrespect for law in general. It is still 
contentious as to whether Prohibition raised the levels of violence. The next 
section will examine violence with reference to modern theories and findings on 





We do find one theory that is consistent with the aggregate time series and cross-country data on crime: the 
view that enforcement of drug prohibition encourages violent dispute resolution.300 
 
Did national alcohol prohibition cause levels of violence to rise? The Prohibition 
crimes that made the news in the 1920s, the shootings, car chases and assaults 
were in the main the result of competing business interests. The organisations 
that managed the production, distribution and sale of alcoholic beverages could 
not avail themselves of mainstream justice. Accordingly, persons involved were 
occasionally compelled to resort to alternate dispute resolution practices - 
displays of force, compulsion and retribution. Clarence Darrow provides a good 
explanation of the bootleggers’ dilemma: 
The business pays very well but it is outside the law and they can’t go to court, like 
shoe dealers or real-estate men or grocers when they think an injustice has been done 
them, or unfair competition has arisen in their territory. So they naturally shoot.301 
 
If an objective of Prohibition was to reduce the levels of violence in society then 
such a strategy is flawed in theory. Rigorous studies by Miron give this conclusion:  
The hypothesis that enforcement of alcohol and drug prohibition plays an independent 
and substantial role in increasing violence by encouraging its use in the resolution of 
commercial disputes is entirely consistent with the evidence.302 
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According to Miron’s theory, Prohibition should have increased levels of violence. 
 
The extent to which Prohibition affected the metrics of criminalised behaviour is 
explored by many academic writers. Homicide is considered one of the best 
measures for societal violence because the levels of reporting and recording of 
this particular form of violence is extremely high. For this reason, homicide 
statistics are often used for their perceived level of reliability. The graph below 
describes a link between enforcement of prohibition and homicidal violence.  
 
    
303 
The results presented above illustrate that over the past century, the major 
fluctuations in the U.S. homicide rate have been positively associated with 
fluctuations in the enforcement of alcohol and drug prohibition.304 Niskanen in a 
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1994 study indicates that an increase in overall enforcement increases the level 
of all forms of recorded crime. Niskanen says that: ‘More police appear to increase 
the reported crime rate, but that observed effect is probably due to a strong effect 
of the number of police on the percentage of crimes reported.’ That is, when there 
are more police more crimes are reported to those police. Interestingly, Niskanen 
goes on to say that ‘an increase in police appears to have no significant effect on 
the violent crime rate ...’ 305 
Levin’s 1998 analysis of crime rates indicates that, once the reporting bias is taken 
into account increasing police numbers has a net positive affect in decreasing 
levels of crime, although this is variable depending upon the type of crime.306 
Property crime tends to be less spontaneous and more calculated than violent 
crime, and so more amenable to deterrence than crimes against the person. 
 
Violent and property crime rates per 100,000: 1932 to 2006.307  
 
 
Statistics for these offences since Prohibition do not as clearly follow Miron’s 
theorem, and statistics diverge from 1990 for reasons beyond the scope of this 
thesis to explain. 
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In enforcing a ban on alcoholic drinks, it appears that law enforcement can expect 
levels of violence, particularly homicidal violence, to rise. Criminalising beverage 
alcohol severs alcohol marketers from formal dispute resolution systems and it 
seems a reasonable conclusion that ‘the homicide rate rose during Prohibition 
due to an increase in non-legal forms of conflict resolution resulting from the 
emergence of black markets and organized crime tied to alcohol’.308 
 
Thornton declares that Prohibition was responsible for a rise in homicides and 
violent crime.309 Professor Mark Moore declares to the contrary that ‘violent crime 
did not increase dramatically during Prohibition. Homicide rates rose dramatically 
from 1900 to 1910 but remained roughly constant during Prohibition's 14 year 
rule.’ 310 Academic opinion is divided, yet the graph that Thornton uses to 
demonstrate his point appears so authoritative: 
 
Homicide Rate: 1910-44 311 
 
 
In 2000 Jensen performed a general analysis of murder rates from 1900 to 2000 
and, after correcting for under-reporting of homicides before 1930, found that 
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Prohibition was correlated negatively with liver cirrhosis mortality and correlated 
positively with the murder rate – an analysis that appears to agree with 
Thornton.312 However, Thornton’s assertion is not reflected in more detailed 
statistical analyses of homicide rates. For instance, in 2009 Asbridge & 
Weerasinghe analysed trends in murder rates in Chicago between 1920 and 1930 
using police reports on all homicides in the city. They examined detailed reports 
that distinguished between deaths that involved alcohol use by the offender or the 
victim, occurred in a bar or involved disputes between alcohol black market 
participants - and those that were not. They found that the overall murder rate in 
Chicago increased during Prohibition but alcohol-related homicides remained 
roughly constant.313 This study appears to indicate that whilst homicides 
increased, the conditions created by Prohibition were not driving that increase. 
  
314 
If Prohibition related crime was pushing the homicide rate higher, why did the rate 
continue to be higher than pre-Prohibition levels three years after repeal? 
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Perhaps Depression-era tensions were behind a thirst for murder or, as Jensen 
suggests, organised criminal groups fighting for control over emerging markets 
for untaxed liquor.315 Nevertheless, the link between Prohibition and homicide 
appears tenuous. 
 
David Teasley in 1992 provided this twist on the data:  
age-adjusted homicide rates for whites changed very little during the Prohibition era, 
scoring 6.2 per 100,000 in 1921, then dropping less than one point downward, and 
returning to 6.0 per 100,000 in 1931. According to a special report by the Public Health 
Service, National  Office of Vital Statistics, the white  rate never rose higher than 6.2 
(1921) and dropped back to the 1920 figure of 4.9 in 1935. 
 
Teasley delivers this conclusion: ‘The slight increase in white homicides is not in 
keeping with the traditional image of Prohibition as a particularly crime-ridden era.’ 
316 
 
Teasley also provides data that indicates a rise in non-white victims of violence:  
In a study of historical trends in violent crime in the United States during this period, 
Ted Robert Gurr concurs with the argument that the murder rate rose but maintains 
that the increase was probably due mainly to a rise in the number of black homicides. 
The age-adjusted death rates for non-white homicide victims in 1920 was 29.2 
compared to 4.9 for whites. The non-white rate continued to rise, reaching a rate of 
46.5 in 1934 before falling.317 
 
Non-white people made up a small and decreasing proportion of those 
incarcerated, indicating that white people were the main murderers of blacks: 
Data provided by the Bureau of Justice Statistics reveal a fairly stable balance in the 
percentage of federal prison admissions by race. In 1927, federal prison admissions 
were 84% white and 14% black; in 1932 and 1933, they were 88% white and 10% 
black. Blacks during this period comprised a little less than 10% of the U.S. 
population.318 
 
Teasley’s data appears to indicate a rise in the murder of nonwhites during the 
1920s, but in all only a slight increase in the overall reported rate of homicides. 
 
Teasley is not alone in his analysis of the data. Owens in 2011 considered that: 
‘The apparent national trend in homicides during prohibition was driven instead 
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by urbanization and the changing demographic composition of the population.’ 
Owens determined this despite her results supporting the economic theory of 
underground markets being associated with violence: 
When alcohol markets were criminal (but alcohol consumption per se was not illegal) 
the political unpopularity of alcohol temperance was positively related to the homicide 
rate. However, even taking this underground into account, the net effect of criminalizing 
alcohol was to reduce, not increase, homicides, plausibly through reduced alcohol 
consumption. Systemic violence is an important source of harm associated with drug 
use. At the same time, systemic violence in the market for alcohol does not appear to 
have been a major cause of crime in the 19th century.319 
 
Owens reiterates this conclusion in another study where she says that 
In most states, dry laws were in fact associated with reductions in the homicide rate. 
The net negative effect of temperance on homicides, even in the presence of a growing 
underground market, is due to the strong positive relationship between alcohol 
consumption and aggression.320 
 
Detailed data analyses indicate that the criminogenic potential of underground 
markets is counterbalanced by the criminogenic potential of alcohol: ‘existing data 
provide no evidence that individuals used lethal force to resolve disputes over 
alcohol on a large enough scale [to] outweigh the reduction in 
psychopharmacological violence’.321 
 
Owens tests this hypothesis against the records on lynchings.  
Using data on county level dry ordinances and organized violence against black 
southerners, we show that local restrictions on the availability of alcohol reduced the 
incidence of lynching. Not only was the approval of a dry ordinance associated with a 
discrete drop in the probability that a lynching occurred, the likelihood that a lynching 
occurred fell each successive year that alcohol sales were banned.322 
 
If any determination can be made of the wobbly statistics perhaps it is this - the 
sorts of crimes which cause disturbance to the usual way of life of most people in 
the United States, that being petty crimes that ‘disturb the peace’, initially 
declined. ‘Dr. Fabian Franklin noted that according to one measure, crime had 
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decreased 37.7 percent between 1910 and 1923.’ These statistics also show 
variance in the type of crime... 
theft of property increased 13.2 percent, homicide increased 16.1 percent, and robbery 
rose 83.3 percent between 1910 and 1923, while minor crimes (which were large in 
number) such as vagrancy, malicious mischief, and public swearing decreased over 50 
percent. 323 
 
Available statistics do not support the theorem that alcohol prohibition caused a 
rise in violent crime when viewed on a per capita basis. If the incidence of petty 
crime is included, statistics indicate that the rate of crime fell during the period – 
notwithstanding the new Prohibition crimes that had been introduced involving the 
production, distribution and sale of alcoholic beverages. The diminution in supply 
of beverage alcohol is positively associated with a reduction in violent crime. 
 
Of all recreational drugs, alcohol seems unique in the magnitude of its potential 
to increase overall levels of violence. Of all drugs, alcohol’s criminogenic impact 
outweighs the criminogenic impact of prohibition enforcement. A comparison may 
be made to the impact of prohibitive enforcement on drug markets, as examined 
in a 2010 study. This study concludes that: 
in 9 (82%) of the studies that employed regression analysis  of  longitudinal  data,  a  
significant positive  association  was  observed  between  drug law  enforcement  
increases  and  increased  levels of  violence. Only one study (9%) reported no 
significant association (i.e., no beneficial or negative impact) between drug law 
enforcement and violence. 
 
The article went on to review two qualitative studies on health harms among illicit 
drug users in the open-air illicit drug market in Sydney, Australia: 
In  these studies,  the  authors  observed  that,  as  dealers exited  the  illicit  drug  
market,  those  willing  to work  in  a  high-risk  environment  entered,  and street  dealing  
thereby  became  more  volatile. Further, the authors noted that the increased volatility 
associated with street dealing resulted in a higher number of violent disputes, which 
have contributed to an increase in murders and non-fatal shootings among individuals 
involved in the illicit drug trade.324 
 
In this example enforcement intervention in the drug market resulted in violence 
far exceeding the potential of the drug’s criminogenic violence. 
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In summary it appears that one drug, alcohol, functions to increase the levels of 
violence in the population.325 Studies also indicate that drug law enforcement 
increases overall levels of violence. If a primary objective of the US national 
alcohol prohibition reform was to reduce the small everyday acts of violence in 
the community, and some of the larger ones as well such as lynching, then this 
succeeded. This reduction was achieved despite the rise in violence that occurred 
because of the bootlegging business and enforcement practices to quash this 
commerce. On balance, what data is available indicates that the USA during the 
period of Prohibition was a more peaceful society punctuated with newsworthy 
acts of violence.  
 
Violence is not the only metric by which a reform’s success is measured. 
Entrepreneurial illegality generates income that is used to reduce the burden of 
doing business in a civilised society under the rule of law. The process by which 
such entrepreneurs achieve this reduction is called corruption, a practice 





Speakeasy: from the practice of speaking quietly about such a place in public, or when inside it, so as not 
to alert the police and neighbors.326 
 
This section examines corrupt behaviour in the context of enforcement, and the 
perception that Prohibition produced large-scale corruption. Corruption manifests 
as the illegitimate search for privilege and gain by a person using the power of 
their public office.327 Corruption is distinguished from a person negligent or 
incompetent in the discharge of the duties of their office. It is not necessarily an 
unintended consequence of a reform that it provides opportunities for corruption. 
This section will show that corruption, rather than being an ad hoc transaction 
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between criminal entrepreneurs and government appointees, is a direct means of 
rewarding the faithful for their support. Corruption is also a means by which 
members of government exercise and increase their power - in the case of 
Prohibition one way in which government achieved this was by creating the 
Prohibition Unit (PU). 
 
Wayne Wheeler, the ASL’s major power broker, created the Prohibition Unit with 
a budget of only three million dollars. Rather than putting the PU agents under 
the authority of the state department also known as the civil service, as was 
standard practice for federal enforcement officers, PU agents were under the 
authority of the Treasury. Andrew Volstead, the man who introduced the National 
Alcohol Prohibition Act to Congress, said that civil service protection guarantees 
‘the offices would be filled with Wets that we could not get rid of’.328  
 
Even so, Wheeler’s choice to exclude PU agents from the civil service might 
appear bewildering. Prohibition agents did not have to abide by the civil services 
stringent rules. Appointments of agents would not be in the hands of non-partisan 
government officials. Instead, power of appointment was given to local politicians. 
In effect, this meant that each prohibition agent had to adhere to their appointee’s 
political whims. To become a prohibition agent in most of the country required no 
qualifications other than the endorsement of a prominent local politician, an ASL 
member or friendly congressman.329  
 
The League used enforcement jobs to reward their faithful troops and ‘dry’ 
politicians went along with the ASL to ensure the League’s support at their re-
election.330 US House Of Representatives member John W. Harreld of Oklahoma 
(for one) openly admitted that his reelection prospects were directly tied to his 
ability to appoint the enforcement agents in his state. Many wet members of 
Congress also took turns at what Senator George Norris of Nebraska called ‘the 
political pie counter.’ Okrent quotes an officer of the National Civil Service League 
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as saying: ‘The plain fact is that the congressmen wanted this plunder’.331 The 
ASL in seeking to avoid a plague of wet officers instead took on board 
incompetence and corruption, complete with a more welcome passenger - the 
ability to offer selective rewards to loyal agents. 
 
Attorney General Daugherty told Congress in 1922 that the civil service was a 
‘hindrance to the government’.332  Daugherty was part of a government led by 
President Warren G. Harding from 1921 to 1923. In the words of historian 
Frederick Lewis Allen in 1931, ‘The Harding Administration was responsible in its 
short two years and five months for more concentrated robbery and rascality than 
any other in the whole history of the Federal Government’.333 The Senate during 
Harding’s term as president had so much liquor that it was warmly referred to as 
‘The Best Bar in Town!’, a hub for entertaining many of Harding’s less scrupulous 
contacts.334 Whilst the civil service may have hindered his government’s ability to 
act without restraint, selective enforcement of Prohibition provided widespread 
opportunity for politicians to enhance their positions. It appears that, perhaps due 
to his presidential style, Harding experienced difficulty in controlling his 
government . . . once telling a visitor ‘I knew this job would be too much for me’.335 
 
The nexus between the corruption of the enforcement arm of government and the 
political is unmistakable. For example, the infamous ‘Ohio gang’ of white collar 
criminals were granted immunity from prosecution on the basis that many of them 
had been close childhood friends of President Harding. Roy A. Haynes, Harding’s 
prohibition commissioner, said that bootleggers regarded an agent’s badge as 
‘nothing but a license to make money … Bootleggers bragged of top political 
connections with representatives in the department of Justice, the bureau of 
internal revenue and the prohibition unit itself’.336 Mabel Willebrandt in 1929 
wrote, ‘No one who is intellectually honest will deny that there has not yet been 
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effective nationwide enforcement’ and that the influence of liquor in politics 
extended ‘up to the Cabinet and the White House in Washington’. According to 
Willebrandt, during Senate and House sittings ‘Senators and congressmen 
appeared on the floor in a drunken condition’.337 
 
The spoils of Prohibition enforcement were not limited to politicians. State police 
forces were also able to share in the plunder. In Chicago serious enforcement 
efforts collapsed shortly after the revelation by the city’s mayor that an estimated 
60 percent of the city’s police force was in the liquor business.338 Mabel 
Willebrandt figured that each of the thirty-two thousand speakeasies in New York 
probably paid a beat cop five dollars a day to keep the taps and the cash register 
open. This estimate was low for establishments located in midtown Manhattan, 
where protection money could run to $150 a week, leading the operators of the 
Bath Club and other upmarket spots to form a sort of bribery collective, paying off 
the authorities from a common pool of money. Willebrandt said: 
It is clear that if the police of New York City, and some of the politicians who control 
their appointments, are not collecting at least one hundred and sixty thousand dollars 
a day or sixty million dollars a year from the speakeasies alone, they are either very 
honest or very stupid. Take your choice! 339 
 
The political nature of appointments led to corruption in the Prohibition Unit at the 
highest level. In Indiana a series of missives that became known as the ‘Dear 
Jerry Letters’ after they were leaked to a newspaper in 1921 revealed that the 
newly installed federal Prohibition director for the region instructed Indianapolis 
police chief Jeremiah Kinney to distribute any confiscated liquor to the director’s 
associates.340 The director was a political appointee. 
 
At the trial of bootlegger Roy Olmstead, the prosecution convinced members of 
the Olmstead organization to testify for the prosecution. Federal agents, acting 
on a tip off from within Olmstead’s organisation, caught Roy Olmstead on 
Thanksgiving morning 1925 unloading liquor from a boat. One member of the 
organisation - and the probable source of the tip - Alfred Hubbard asked for and 
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received an appointment as a federal Prohibition agent in exchange for inside 
information.341 Of all the rewards for ‘snitching’ on his boss, why would Alfred 
Hubbard want a federal Prohibition job? 
 
The maximum wage of $2,300 was very low even for the USA in 1921. From its 
inception, the Prohibition Unit experienced high turnover - by 1927 the PU, now 
called the Prohibition Bureau, had received its fourth chief administrator. At any 
one time, the total PU staff of administrators, agents and investigators, charged 
with the policing of illicit liquor trafficking across the entire United States, never 
numbered more than 4,500 men.342 Most agents’ employment only lasted several 
months. Over the first 11 years of the Prohibition Unit (then Prohibition Bureau's) 
history, 17,972 men were employed, of whom 11,982 left the bureau without 
prejudice and 1,604 were dismissed for cause. ‘Separated without prejudice' 
means that their criminal involvement could not be proved. ‘Dismissed for cause’ 
meant that the officers committed offenses that could be proved but might not 
warrant sentencing, or that would involve costly, publicised trials.343 The low 
numbers employed in Prohibition duties meant that the spoils accruing from 
employment were concentrated in but a few prized positions. Alfred Hubbard, it 
would appear, was not prepared to forfeit his highly remunerative position in the 
Olmstead gang without having an unofficially well-paid federal job to be getting 
on with. 
 
The profusion of corruption during the Prohibition years encouraged underworld 
crime bosses in their belief that anyone could be bought. ‘I just couldn’t 
understand that guy [La Guardia],’ said ‘Lucky’ Luciano to his ghostwriters. ‘When 
we offered to make him rich he wouldn’t even listen. ... So I figured: what the hell, 
let him keep City Hall, we got all the rest, the D.A., the cops, everything’.344 
 
Explaining how the system worked, George Remus the ‘king of the bootleggers’ 
told the St. Louis Post-Dispatch: 
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I never handed over the money personally, usually the go-between was the politician 
who had got the official his job.  In that case,  he sometimes  got more  out of it than  
the  official himself ... a  greedier lot of parasites  never existed ... A  few men  have 
tried to  corner the wheat market only to find that there is too much wheat in the world. 
I tried to corner the  graft market, but I learnt there  isn't enough  money in the  world  
to  buy up  all the public officials  who demand their share of it. 
 
Remus estimated that he spent half his gross earnings in bribes.345 
 
Remus said that in his entire career he only came across two people who refused 
to be corrupted. One was Burt Morgan, the Prohibition director of Indiana, who 
‘could have had $250,000’ to look the other way. The other was Sam Collins, the 
Kentucky Prohibition director, whom Remus offered $100,000 simply to quit his 
job and take up a far more remunerative appointment as the manager of a soft-
drink plant. As state Prohibition directors, Morgan and Collins were each earning 
$4,600 a year.346  
 
From the top, corruption in the Bureau ran all the way to the bottom. For example, 
a federal agent called Mellin was tapping a room in which Remus held meetings. 
‘One day alone, Remus had forty-four people in, and some of them were Federal 
prohibition agents or deputy marshals’, Mellin wrote. ‘He paid them an average of 
$1,000 apiece.’ Mellin took his information to an official in Cincinnati, who said, 
‘Son, there are times when a man has to be practical in this business. It’s only a 
few weeks to election, and the information you’ve dug up is political dynamite. 
The men you spied on - the agents and marshals - are political appointees. Go 
back to New York and forget it’.347 
 
Corruption was not limited to the Bureau of Prohibition. The New York Times on 
January 7, 1927 reported that the crew of a Coast Guard patrol boat ran liquor 
ashore from ‘Rum Row’, helped the rum ships to do business, set erring skippers 
on their course and accepted money and whisky for their services.348 The Bureau 
of Customs, or parts thereof, also ‘had its nose in the trough’. 
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The political feeding trough was not to last. Congress, by act of March 3, 1927 
created in the Department of the Treasury two bureaus - a Bureau of Customs 
and a Bureau of Prohibition, each under a commissioner. The Secretary of the 
Treasury was authorised to appoint in each bureau one assistant commissioner, 
two deputy commissioners, one chief clerk, and such other officers and 
employees as he might deem necessary. The Bureau of Prohibition Act provided 
that the appointments should be subject to the provisions of the Civil Service laws 
and salaries fixed in accordance with the classification act of 1923.349 Prohibition 
agents became part of the civil service. Existing agents were so ill-qualified that 
three quarters failed to pass the necessary tests. In the reshuffle, the famously 
effective prohibition officer Izzy Einstein was fired, unofficially, because his 
success in tracking down Volstead Act breakers had upset one too many 
influential figures.350 In 1930, the Prohibition Bureau became part of the 
Department of Justice at which time the Wickersham Commission reported: ‘there 
has been an improvement in the efficiency and character of enforcement 
methods, since the enforcement unit was placed under Civil Service, and since 
the transfer of the unit to the Department of Justice’.351 
 
Imagine the perfect combination of opportunity for criminal entrepreneurs - laws 
to keep legitimate businessmen out of the industry, and corrupt or incompetent 
administrations to keep the cops and other enforcement officials off their backs. 
During Prohibition Congress and state legislatures passed laws banning alcohol 
whilst wet mayors and governors declined to enforce them.352 Contrast the 
policing of alcohol prohibition in the 1920s with the policing of illegal drugs in more 
modern times … 
 
Today more than a dozen agencies are engaged in combating drug trafficking. 
The US national drug strategy is coordinated by the Office of National Drug 
Control Policy, a strategy calling for both supply reduction that includes 
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interdiction, investigations, international action, prosecution, corrections, 
intelligence, and state and local assistance . . . and reducing demand through 
prevention and treatment to deal with the modern ‘drug problem’. Federal 
employees of participating agencies are under the civil service and are not 
political appointees. The organisational structure, its effectiveness and the types 
of employee problems faced by the Prohibition Bureau in the 1920s are not the 
same as those found in federal agencies participating in the national drug strategy 
today.353 There is a unanimity of purpose and precision of coordination not 
present in state and federal enforcement efforts of Prohibition times, yet for all 
this the ‘cost’ both socially and financially is enormous (see IV:B).  
 
Economically well-developed countries may view themselves as substantially 
immunised against the corrupting influence of illegal entrepreneurial activity. 
Developing countries, to avoid corruption, ensure that there is a lack of 
opportunity for corrupt opportunities in their legislation - unless, of course, it is the 
intent of the legislators to frame law that provides kickbacks to politicians and their 





 [T]he prison has been proposed as the solution to the problem it seems to create.354 
 
This section examines the effect of Prohibition upon rates of incarceration, and 
seeks to further dispel the myth of Prohibition as a lawless period in US history. 
Statistics from the period are used to promote various ideologies - statistics that 
when placed in context do not endorse the conclusions of these scholars.  
 
In 1991 Libertarian economist Mark Thornton presented various figures on 
Prohibition imprisonment: 
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By 1932 the number of federal convicts had increased 561 percent, to 26,589, and the 
federal prison population had increased 366 percent ... The number of people convicted 
of Prohibition violations increased 1,000 percent between 1925 and 1930, and fully half 
of all prisoners received in 1930 had been convicted of such violations. Two-thirds of 
all prisoners received in 1930 had been convicted of alcohol and drug offenses. 
 
In line with this – ‘Total federal expenditures on penal institutions increased more 
than 1,000 percent between 1915 and 1932’.355 Thornton attributes much of this 
increase to violations of the Volstead Act and other Prohibition laws. 
 
Thornton and other scholars seek to present the following graph as evidence of 
the failure of Prohibition because of the seen increase in prison populations. This 
assertion is disingenuous for two reasons: 
1. Federal prisons accommodated persons convicted of a federal crime. State 
prisons accommodated detainees under State law. The Volstead Act 
represented a significant expansion of Federal power in the area of criminal 
enforcement and incarceration. It follows that there will be more Federal 
prisoners. 
2. A number of States that had been ‘dry’ before the Volstead Act were content 
to hand over the cost and responsibility of enforcement and punishment to 
the Federal Government. It follows that there will be an increase in numbers 
of prisoners under Federal jurisdiction. 
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The rise in the population of Sing Sing Prison over five years is reflected in the 
overall Federal prison population. In 1920, federal prisons contained just over 
5,000 inmates; ten years later there were over 12,000, more than 4,000 of whom 
were serving time for liquor violations - indicating an increase of about 3000 due 
to other causes.357  
 
The Volstead Act represented a substantial increase in the internal policing 
powers of the Federal government. Before Prohibition, Federal prisoners were 
incarcerated for such minor crimes as Federal mail fraud. It is in no way 
extraordinary that Federal prison populations should rise due to alcohol 
production, transport and sale being criminalised and this prohibition enforced. 
Such enforcement received more funds under an initiative of President Hoover in 
1929, raising apprehension and conviction rates for that period.358 
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Examining the Federal prison population numbers provides an incomplete picture 
of incarceration in 1920s USA. It is more accurate to look at the overall level of 
detainees. As the length of sentences given to offenders coming before county, 
state and federal courts increased, so too was there an overall increase in prison, 
local jail, and juvenile detention populations:  
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Nation-wide prison populations do not accurately reflect the level of criminalised 
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A closer examination of the period reveals that incarceration rates trended higher 
during the years between 1925 and 1940, the only reversal being at the end of 
1933 when prisoners jailed for Prohibition crimes were released. Whilst 
incarceration increased during the Prohibition years, note that rates of 
incarceration were higher in 1940 than at any time during the Prohibition years. 
Caplow and Simon attribute the second peak in incarceration rates that occurred 
later in the 1930s to a panic fed by the Depression and well-publicized crimes 
such as the Lindbergh kidnapping, which intensified federal efforts in crime 
control.363  
 
From the graphs above it is clear that the rate of incarceration, whilst positively 
affected by Prohibition, did not increase during the 1920s significantly above the 
trend of the times. Given the criminogenic potential of alcohol, as mentioned in 
section II.E: Alcohol and the mind, the diminution of alcohol supply and thus 
consumption engendered an expectation that Prohibition should exert a negative 
effect upon prison populations. Prohibition did not result in so significant a 
decrease in offences resulting in incarceration that government could (as 
Reverend Billy Sunday prophesied) ‘turn our prisons into factories and our jails 
into storehouses and corncribs’.364  
 
The increase in prison populations was not disproportionate to the period. During 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was a great rise in the 
number of acts which society chose to designate as criminal. Many acts formerly 
regulated by social or business customs, discipline being provided in the home or 
the church or recovery being had by civil action, were denounced by criminal 
legislation and turned over to enforcement officers. Laws regulating the sale of 
securities, laws governing the issuance of checks and other evidences of value 
were comparatively new in their creation. Many laws regulating traffic came with 
the development of the automobile. Large urban growths brought a multitude of 
laws regulating building, sanitation and health, which in earlier days were 
unnecessary. Improved means of communication and transportation brought 
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people closer together and multiplied the frictions that seem to require 
governmental supervision.365 
 
Dean Pound observed, ‘of one hundred thousand persons arrested in Chicago in 
1912, more than one half were held for violation of legal precepts which did not 
exist twenty-five years before’.366 The growth in urbanisation and government 
control mechanisms resulted in the criminalisation of large numbers of people 
who previously would have escaped official sanctioning and incarceration. This 
trend has continued to the present day, involving a reorienting of fiscal and 
administrative resources toward the criminal justice system at both the federal 
and state level. The result has been a more authoritarian executive, a more 
passive legislature, and a more defensive judiciary. 367 
 
The image of Prohibition-era prisons crowded with bootleggers and gangsters is 
not borne out by the available statistics. Prohibition was a mere ‘blip on the radar’ 
of a popular trend criminalising and incarcerating large numbers of the US 
population. Whilst the federal prison population rose to almost one third of the 
state prison populations during Prohibition this population was maintained after 
the end of Prohibition, indicating that there were other factors in play. These 
factors continued to the extent that in 2003 the US was the leading incarcerator 
in the world, only being outdone by the Seychelles in 2016.368 369 
 
As the number of criminal statutes and the resulting number of criminal 
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K The Judicial System 
 
To enter a dominion is to place oneself under the protection of the violent power that is the prince.370  
 
This section examines the assertion that the judiciary was overloaded with 
Prohibition cases to the extent that the system became practically unworkable; 
and the effect this had upon the status of the judicial system as an institution. The 
judicial system is one means by which the State maintains discipline and order in 
a manner acceptable to both the propertied aristocracy and the masses.371 In the 
words of 1920s ‘radical lawyer’ William Kunstler: 
there is the disquieting thought that the legal subsystem itself is nothing more than the 
new tyrant's most reliable weapon to ward off any seemingly potent threat to the 
continuation of yesterday into tomorrow. If the injunction and the conviction can achieve 
the same results as the rope and sword, judges are, after all, far more comfortable 
companions than executioners. And in the last analysis, due process of law is exactly 
what the high and mighty say it is.372 
 
The judicial process is not for everyone - judicial deliberations tend to be slow and 
time-consuming – a system highly consumptive of resources both intellectual and 
in manpower. It is a system to be used . . . judiciously, as seen in this section. 
 
The inexperience of Prohibition officers was telling in the early days of Prohibition. 
Too often arrests were made and prosecutions instituted without sufficient 
evidence to justify them. There were many instances of unwarranted searches 
and seizures, resulting in the refusal by Commissioners to issue warrants of 
arrest, or in the dismissal of the prosecution by the courts. In some instances, the 
character and appearance of the prohibition agents were such that the United 
States attorney had no confidence in the case and juries paid little attention to the 
witnesses. Due to the metric by which they worked, prohibition agents sought to 
secure a large number of arrests or seizures rather than to bring to the District 
Attorneys carefully prepared cases of actual importance. The first seven years' 
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experience in enforcing Prohibition resulted in the prohibition forces achieving a 
poor reputation in the eyes of many of the United States attorneys and judges.373 
 
Prohibition was unveiled during a period where the number of criminal statutes 
and thus criminal defendants greatly increased, overwhelming the court 
systems.374 This criminalisation necessitated plea bargaining’s emergence into 
mainstream criminal procedure and its rise to dominance. The number of federal 
convictions resulting from pleas of guilty rose from 50% to 72% between 1908 
and 1916.375 Then, in 1919, a piece of legislation was passed that considerably 
increased judicial workloads and almost assured plea-bargaining’s preeminence. 
The Volstead Act guaranteed the right to a jury trial for anyone charged with a 
violation. 
 
In 1920, 5,095 of the 34,230 cases terminated in the federal courts involved 
prohibition violation; during 1929, 75,298 prohibition cases alone were concluded. 
In New York, six judges and one magistrate were expected to dispose of fifty 
thousand cases annually. Emory Buckner, the United States Attorney for the 
southern district of New York, concocted a plea bargaining opportunity that 
became known as ‘Bargain Day’. Publicly promising to request light fines in 
exchange for guilty pleas, he invited defendants to the Old Post Office Building 
south of City Hall, where his staff, working with two federal judges, could process 
five hundred cases a day.376 
 
By 1925, pleas of guilty, without jury trials, accounted for over 90 percent of the 
convictions obtained in federal courts.377 The era of Prohibition functioned to 
accelerate a change in the whole US judicial system favouring plea-bargaining - 
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in 2011; Lindsey Devers estimated that between 90 and 95% of convicted 
defendants in the entirety of today’s US criminal justice system plead guilty.378 
 
Prohibition also saw a sharp rise in jury nullification, ‘the right to nullify on the 
basis of conscience in the name of the community’.379 In New York, the first 4000 
arrests under the Mullan-Gage law, the concurrent state version of the Volstead 
Act, resulted in fewer than five hundred indictments, which led in turn to only six 
convictions and not even one jail sentence. Assistant District Attorney Mabel 
Willebrandt acknowledged, ‘juries will not convict if the punishment does not fit 
the crime’.380 Juries nullified the law in an apparent belief that no punishment was 
appropriate for breaking the liquor statutes. 
 
William B. Smith, M.D. a Township Judge in Kernville, California wrote: ‘In this 
county, one of the largest in the second largest state of the union, a jury conviction 
has not been obtained in a liquor case in the last two years’. He continued: 
‘Invariably in that group will be one or more men or women who have been 
violating the very law they are hearing’.381 In the same vein J. R. Taylor, a Former 
Prosecuting Attorney of Martinsville, Virginia wrote, ‘Because of this defect, 
judges and prosecutors, realizing the futility of going to trial with enemies of the 
law on the jury, have often accepted, by way of compromise, light punishments, 
because it was making the best of a hopeless situation’.382 
 
In modern times, there has been an apparent rise in juries nullifying marijuana 
cases in the USA.383 Whilst no statistics are available on the percentage of 
marijuana cases that are nullified by jury, some law firms are prepared to advise 
their clients in the use of this strategy.384 It is a common practice that ‘a judge will 
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instruct a jury to apply the law as it is given to them whether they agree with the 
law or not’.385 Advocating jury nullification to jurors is risky, as prosecutors 
understandably disfavour such advice.386 Nevertheless as a grassroots force for 
legal change, exercising the right to conscientiously refuse to convict an accused 
charged with violating a perceived ‘bad law’ remains a powerful tool for those 
seeking to drive reform.387 In the words of Paul Butler in The New York Times, 
‘jurors need to know that they can say no’.388 
 
Prohibition was an extension of police power and the justice system was required 
to grow with it. Kenneth Murchison stated this succinctly: 
The Court contributed to the growth of doctrinal complexity in two ways. One was to 
create new doctrinal categories by holding that the fourth amendment's protection of 
the home does not extend to ‘open fields’ that the amendment does not apply to the 
tapping of telephone conversations, and that the warrant requirement does not apply 
to automobile searches. More commonly, the Court refined subcategories that had 
remained undeveloped in pre-prohibition cases. For example, the Court expanded the 
common law of arrest and struggled to define the scope of warrantless searches 
conducted incident to such arrests. It also defined the degree of federal involvement 
necessary to apply the fourth amendment to searches conducted in whole or in part by 
state or local officers; it struggled to explain and to apply the probable cause standard 
in a variety of circumstances; and it gave content to statutory and constitutional 
provisions governing the issuance of search warrants.389 
 
In response to the difficulties in imposing Prohibition and the increased power of 
organised crime to avoid legal consequences the court systems’ power to impose 
justice upon the population was also increased. Whether this resulted in a more 
‘just’ system in line with Rawls’ popular theories of distributive justice is debatable, 
however it certainly made for a more tyrannical state.390 
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The use of wiretap evidence in the prosecution of bootlegger Roy Olmstead was 
particularly controversial. Mabel Walker Willebrandt, who usually represented the 
government before the Supreme Court in Prohibition-related cases, refused to 
represent the government at oral arguments against Olmstead because she 
opposed the use of wiretap evidence. Following Justice Taft’s decision in 
Olmstead, more and more commentators concluded that Prohibition had become 
a threat to the rule of law in the United States. According to The Nation, the Court 
had endorsed a kind of ‘lawlessness’ in a misguided effort to enforce Prohibition. 
A leading business newspaper called wiretapping a ‘dirty business’ - the business 
of unacceptable federal intrusion into the lives of constituents. Even a leader of 
the Anti-Saloon League protested the acceptance of wiretapping, fearing that the 
practice would turn public opinion against Prohibition.391 
 
Such practices did turn the general consensus against Prohibition. The feeling 
that the state was losing its battle against bootleggers, the rise in drunkenness, 
and the perception of a crime wave sponsored by alcohol all contributed to a 
feeling of failure. The large number of persons accused of the new crimes of 
alcohol manufacture, distribution and sale necessitated a high throughput of 
cases. The rise in plea-bargaining changed the balance between liberty and 
control in favour of more authoritarian police practices and exacerbated the 
practice of paramilitary policing rather than a more community-based style of 
public engagement.  
 
In summary, based upon the expenditure of resources and reduction in civil 
liberties Prohibition cannot be seen as a success for the judiciary. In terms of 
expanded judicial powers and a greater access to authoritarian tools to exercise 
despotic rule Prohibition was a triumph. Common people exercising their right to 
jury nullification brought the legitimacy of the justice system into disrepute - the 
system works best when accepted hegemonically, its participants unconsciously 
expressing their submission to not only ‘how things are’ but accepting that this is 
‘how they should be’. This includes the system of plea-bargaining where often 
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innocent people, to spare themselves the rigours and uncertainty of a jury trial, 
will plead guilty to a lesser charge or accept a lesser sentence - the province of 
the common folk. More well-resourced persons accused of a crime will exercise 
their power to escape conviction - the rigours of a jury trial being enough 
punishment for anyone of a higher social status. The criminal justice system, it 
would appear, requires an enormous throughput of the accused to achieve its 






Was Prohibition a success? Absolutely - at first. By all the metrics that matter - 
production and consumption, homicide and violence, petty crime and family life, 
drunkenness and health, economic prosperity and industrial safety . . . Prohibition 
achieved its stated aims. The results achieved in reducing the supply of alcohol 
is consistent with theory. Alcohol is a damaging drug with clear health and 
cognitive detriments to the imbiber. Liquor disinhibits the user, reduces capacity 
for social niceties and makes internal urgings more primal. Alcohol’s stress 
relieving and social lubricant effects in no way balance these detriments. 
 
Prohibition appears to have increased industrial productivity in its early years, and 
contributed to the general rise in the standard of living of people throughout the 
USA before that nation’s plunge into economic depression from the end of 1929. 
It is difficult to measure the degree to which Prohibition directly contributed to 
economic growth. Costing Prohibition’s benefits represents an interesting avenue 
of enquiry for the economically inclined, though the data upon which such a 
calculation is based may no longer be in evidence. 
 
The positive effects of alcohol prohibition diminished during the years that the 
National Prohibition Act was in effect. Under-resourcing, state and federal rivalry 
and a general lack of coherent political will marred the Act’s implementation. The 
US government was required to build a large interlinked structure of social control, 
and there were failures both administratively and in policing. The underwhelming 
public support for Prohibition affected both police and judicial functioning. Policing 
methods moved from community-based initiatives to a more paramilitary style. 
Plea-bargaining became more common as the court system sought to reduce its 
workload. This trend continued such that the USA, amongst all countries, is 
preeminent in the use of trial waivers.392  
 
                                            




Given the requirement for a jury trial of all those accused of Prohibition offences, 
public opinion attained greater sway. Juries discovered their ability to nullify a law, 
and there arose a fear for societal stability and the institutions of order. The fear 
that disrespect for one law may bleed over into disrespect for all laws is 
unfounded. There is no evidence that this occurs. People, it would seem, are able 
to distinguish between laws they wish to support and those they do not.393 
 
There is no doubt that Prohibition provided opportunities for corrupt behaviour. 
The initial bureaucratic arrangements guaranteed that it would be so. These 
arrangements rewarded politically faithful subordinates and contributors with 
opportunities for graft, opportunities that in the highly remunerative illegal alcohol 
trade encouraged abuses of power. Prohibition provided general incentives for all 
government officials touched by the alcohol trade to indulge in corruption. 
 
The economics of prohibition changed the way alcohol entrepreneurs did 
business. Alcohol consumption data (such as is available) suggests that an initial 
drop was followed by a rise as the period continued - the ban on beverage alcohol 
production, distribution and sale did not increase the price of alcohol sufficiently 
to deter consumption. Those who drank tended to consume spirits rather than 
beer because producers favoured distributing spirits rather than the riskier bulky 
beverages such as wine and beer. These changes in consumption patterns 
contributed to the lack of sustainably achieved positive health outcomes in some 
areas - alcohol-induced scarring of the liver known as cirrhosis became as 
frequent as before Prohibition, and people died from consuming commercially 
poisoned industrial alcohol.  
 
Initially, Prohibition decreased government revenue and in the end failed to 
restrain much of alcohol’s social cost whilst adding an additional burden of 
enforcement expense. Much of the initial gains made by Prohibition evaporated 
by the turn of the decade. 1920s alcohol prohibition was difficult to implement - 
under-resourcing, state and federal rivalry and a general lack of coherent political 
will marred the Act’s enforcement. Nevertheless, given the enormous social cost 
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of alcohol, a cost that is not balanced by the prosocial effects of alcohol 
consumption, even those remaining gains can be considered sufficient to justify 
the continued implementation of alcohol prohibition. 
 
A rigorous examination of Prohibition disfavours the view that the National 
Prohibition Act of 1919 lacked success in achieving its stated aims and objectives. 
Academic works that focus, for instance, upon federal imprisonment rates as 
proof of a ‘crime wave’ are mistaken. There was no crime wave. Prohibition 
functioned to decrease the rate of crime in general, as its proponents said that it 
would. Productivity increased slightly; family, home and community life became 
safer and calmer than it would have been without the intervention of Prohibition. 
 
The repeal of Prohibition frames its public perception as a failure. Admitting that 
a national reform, proudly embedded into the Constitution, was so poorly 
designed, implemented and advertised that it had to be repealed thirteen years 
later does not bolster the nation’s perception of its character. It plays far better to 
say that a national prohibition of alcoholic beverages is inherently unworkable and 
against the interests of the public. This thesis indicates that, given favourable 
conditions, alcohol prohibition should be little more difficult to enforce than the 
interdiction of other drugs. 
 
The ‘noble experiment’ of Prohibition was not so singular as to never be repeated 
- national drug prohibition has been operating with a qualified level of success 
since 1937. A plethora of studies indicate that it is difficult to justify the present 
regime of drug prohibition on health or economic grounds, a matter beyond the 
scope of this thesis.394 Nevertheless, the enormous unrecovered cost of alcohol 
to the US nation presents a forceful argument for this particular drug’s prohibition. 
Alcohol’s estimated social costs of $185 billion (p32) far exceed the present costs 
of enforcing drug prohibition at $41 billion (p56). Were taxation receipts diverted 
                                            
394 See, e.g., Caitlin Elizabeth Hughes and Alex Stevens, ‘A Resounding Success or a Disastrous Failure: Re-
Examining the Interpretation of Evidence on the Portuguese Decriminalisation of Illicit Drugs: A 
Resounding Success or a Disastrous Failure’ (2012) 31(1) Drug and Alcohol Review 101. 
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from drug to alcohol prohibition the US could reap a large net economic and social 
benefit.395 
 
Prohibition’s repeal in 1933 functioned to skew the reporting of this period of 
history. The reason for this is a very human one. As quoted at the start of this 
thesis: ‘... with whom does the historical writer of historicism actually empathize. 
The answer is irrefutably with the victor’.396 The victory of anti-Prohibition forces 
has allowed, to an extent, the rewriting of history. 
 
It is understandable that so many writers both academic and mainstream decry 
the 1920s reform of alcohol prohibition. Reporting bias changed the weighting and 
availability of data both during and after the era of Prohibition. Prohibition became 
a poster child for those writers seeking to promote an unrestricted trade in goods 
and services, individual ‘freedoms’, and entrenched investment structures. 
Accordingly, the general tenor of information available to the researcher tends to 
favour these ideologies and interests.  
 
Despite the facts not being in evidence in this thesis (being beyond the narrow 
scope possible in a Masters), researching this area reveals the reason alcohol 
prohibition ultimately failed to endure. It was the lack of unified political will to 
promote and enforce the National Prohibition Act. The government and other 
hegemonic forces in the US did not speak in a united voice over the issue of 
alcohol prohibition. Their narrative surrounding the banning of alcohol was diffuse, 
and a large proportion of the public remained unconvinced of Prohibition’s 
benefits. Accordingly, the Act was insufficiently popular and the US did not commit 
the resources required to successfully prosecute this initiative. The intersection 
between the politics of Prohibition and law represents a rewarding avenue of 
research arising from this thesis. 
 
                                            
395 See, e.g., National Drug Intelligence Center (U.S.), The Economic Impact of Illicit Drug Use on American 
Society (U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, 2011) 
<https://books.google.com.au/books?id=S7evnQEACAAJ>. 
396 Benjamin et al, above n 1. 
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Perhaps Charles Whitebread best describes the politician’s view of Prohibition in 
his speech to the California Judges Association 1995 annual conference. Defining 
the attitude of the 1919 Congress as it enacted Prohibition, he said ‘And as soon 
as it passed, what do you think they said? "Well, what do you know? Success. 
Let's have a drink.”’ 397 
  
                                            
397 Charles Whitebread, The History of the Non-Medical Use of Drugs in the United States (1995) 
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